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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation contains three essays that explore how nursing homes respond to public 
reporting, changes in regulation and payments, as well as heterogeneity across organizational 
forms. More specifically, I focus on three important issues in the nursing home industry: public 
reporting, corporate chains, and financial performance. Having implications on the quality of 
care in the industry, these issues play important roles in shaping long-term care in the United 
States. 
The first chapter evaluates the effects of simplified report cards for nursing homes on 
their financial performance. Starting in 2008, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
adopted a five-star quality rating system for nursing homes to provide consumers an easier way 
to compare facilities and encourage facilities to improve quality of care. Using a unique dataset 
containing the unpublished underlying quality scores and relevant thresholds used to assign the 
number of stars for each nursing home from 2008 to 2013, I implement a regression 
discontinuity design to estimate the effects of star ratings on nursing homes’ financial 
performance. I find that both revenues and costs of the 5-star nursing homes are significantly 
higher than those of nearly identical 4-star facilities. Upon further investigation, the main effects 
are due to a shift toward a more favorable payer mix. In addition, the effects are stronger in more 
competitive markets. Overall, the results suggest that nursing homes do not gain financially by 
getting an additional star under the new public reporting system. 
 xvi 
In the second chapter, I examine how practice patterns of nursing homes vary by chain 
affiliation. In 1998, Medicare implemented a Prospective Payment System (PPS) for post-acute 
care provided by nursing homes. Primarily based on therapy minutes, the PPS created an 
incentive for nursing homes to provide high-intensity therapy services. Accounting for more than 
50% of nursing homes, chains may choose to affect affiliated facilities’ practice patterns. This 
paper aims to examine whether the selection of therapy treatment levels for nursing home 
residents differs between independent and chain-acquired nursing homes from 2003 to 2009, 
using a Difference-in-Differences estimation approach. I find that independent facilities acquired 
by chains experience a 2.92 percentage point increase in the proportion of residents with the 
highest therapy treatment level. These chain effects may last years after acquisition. In addition, I 
find that the main effects are mostly due to acquisitions by large chains and for-profit chains. 
However, the increase in treatment intensity does not lead to a shorter length of stay. 
In the third chapter, I investigate the predictors for chain acquisitions of independent 
nursing homes, focusing on the financial aspects of acquired targets. The purpose of this study is 
to understand the motivations behind chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes, with a 
focus on financial performance of the targeted facilities. I use a facility-year level discrete time 
logit model to predict the probability of an independent nursing home being acquired by a chain 
from 2000 to 2010. I find that chains are more likely to acquire nursing homes with worse 
financial performance. These findings raise important issues about the federal government’s 
efforts to make ownership information transparent and to set up an effective transaction 
monitoring mechanism for the nursing home industry. 
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Chapter 1 Do better quality star ratings improve firms’ financial 
performance? Evidence from the nursing home industry 
1.1 Introduction 
Economic theory suggests that asymmetric information could lead to market inefficiencies 
or even market failure (Akerlof, 1970). Due to uncertainty about quality and agency problems, 
healthcare markets can be particularly problematic (Arrow, 1963). To address this issue, the 
federal government has introduced various report cards for several industries within the 
healthcare sector. The objective of these report cards is to provide more information so 
consumers can make informed choices and providers have incentives to improve quality of care. 
However, research suggests that this approach has limited effects on quality and consumer 
demand (Dranove et al., 2003; Stevenson, 2006; Werner et al., 2012). One possible explanation 
for the limited effectiveness of quality information releases is that the information in report cards 
may have been too complex to be useful to many consumers (Peters et al., 2007; Damman et al., 
2009; Hibbard et al., 2010; Bardach et al., 2011; Findlay, 2016). In response to this concern, the 
federal government began to roll out a variety of simplified summary rating systems across 
nursing homes, dialysis facilities, home health agencies, and hospitals most recently. 
It is important for both providers and the government to know whether this new reporting 
format works. Much of the existing work on public reporting has focused on its intended effects 
on consumer demand and provider response. However, public reporting may also have important 
financial implications for healthcare providers. For example, higher-rated providers could 
potentially attract more patients, shift toward a more favorable payer mix, or raise prices for 
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private-pay patients. Theoretically, these changes would lead to an increase in revenues. 
However, on the other hand, improving quality of care may also cost more for healthcare 
providers. Therefore, could healthcare providers reap financial benefits by performing well in 
report cards? Few studies have explored this issue. This paper aims to examine the relationship 
between public reporting and financial performance of healthcare providers to bridge gaps in the 
existing literature, using the data from nursing home industry. 
This study focuses on report cards and financial performance in the nursing home industry 
for several reasons. First, in December 2008, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) adopted a summarized five-star rating design to its existing public reporting website ― 
Nursing Home Compare, which publishes quality information for each nursing home that 
participates in Medicare or Medicaid. This new star design is expected to be much easier for 
consumers to understand. Compared to previous versions of nursing home report cards that 
presented detailed but complex quality metrics, the straightforward graphical presentation of five 
stars has a potential to generate a stronger effect for high-performing nursing homes. In the 
management and economics literature, existing empirical evidence generally supports the 
argument that consumers’ perceived quality of firms, which is often based on some types of 
rankings, is positively associated with financial performance (McGuire et al., 1990; Deephouse, 
2000; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Raithel and Schwaiger, 2015). However, to date, few studies 
have addressed this issue focusing on the new public reporting system in the nursing home 
industry. The ease of interpretation and access to the five-star rating system has provided 
consumers with an opportunity to make informed choices based on nursing homes’ performance. 
Given that previous findings on the effects of nursing home report cards have been modest 
(Stevenson, 2006; Werner et al., 2012), evaluating whether this new system yields different 
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results is of great importance. Second, due to changes in payment system, legal environment, and 
governmental budgetary constraints, many nursing homes have struggled financially during the 
past two decades. Because nursing homes provide care for frail elderly ― one of the most 
vulnerable population groups in the United States, it is critically important for the society to pay 
attention to the financial health of nursing homes so quality of care can be sustained in the long 
run. If nursing homes could gain financial benefits by performing well in the report card, they 
will be more likely to be incentivized to engage with quality improvement. 
Specifically, the main research question of this study is whether higher-rated nursing 
homes benefit financially from the five-star quality rating system. In addition, if there is an 
association, what are the main mechanisms? Does the effect vary across different nursing home 
markets depending on their competitiveness? Establishing a plausibly causal relationship 
between star ratings and financial performance is challenging. For example, a nursing home that 
faces strong demand due to its high quality might already have had higher revenues even in the 
absence of a higher star rating. To address the potential endogeneity of the star ratings, through a 
special request to CMS, I construct a unique dataset including the unpublished, continuous 
quality scores and thresholds used to assign the number of stars for each nursing home, and 
implement a regression discontinuity design to compare the financial performance of similar 
nursing homes with quality scores close to the star thresholds during the period from 2008 to 
2013. I find that both revenues and costs are significantly higher for 5-star nursing homes, 
compared to their 4-star counterparts with comparable characteristics. The results are robust to a 
variety of bandwidth selections and different functional forms. In contrast, the star effects for 
nursing homes with scores close to other thresholds are either statistically insignificant or 
sensitive to bandwidth selections. No significant profit margin effect is found across any of the 
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four thresholds. Upon further investigation, the significant effects for 5-star nursing homes are 
mainly due to an increase in the proportion of private-pay residents. In addition, the effects of 
star ratings are stronger in more competitive markets. These results suggest that nursing homes 
do not gain financial benefits by earning an additional star under the new public reporting 
system. 
1.2 Institutional background 
1.2.1 Nursing home industry 
In the United States, nursing homes provide both traditional long-term care services and 
short-term post-acute care for the elderly population. There are about 15,600 nursing homes 
serving roughly 1.4 million elderly on any given day (National Center for Health Statistics, 
2015). Expenditure on nursing homes across the country was about $160 billion in 2014 and is 
projected to reach $270 billion in 2023 (CMS, 2014). Medicare and Medicaid combined pay 
nearly 80% of the total nursing home costs, while out-of-pocket payments account for the rest 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013). Typically, Medicaid ― the largest payer for nursing home 
services ― pays for long-term stays, while Medicare ― a more generous payer compared to 
Medicaid ― pays for services related to short-term stays such as post-acute care. Nursing home 
care is a mixed industry in terms of profit status and chain membership of the facilities. Based on 
the On-line Survey, Certification, and Reporting system (OSCAR), approximately two thirds of 
nursing homes are for-profit facilities. The proportion of chain-affiliated facilities grew quickly 
from less than 40% to over 50% from the 1990s to early 2000s (Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002). 
Since then, chain-owned nursing homes have consistently accounted for more than 50% of 
nursing homes each year (Grabowski et al., 2016).  
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The quality of care in nursing homes has been an important policy issue for several 
decades (Institute of Medicine, 1986). In addition, the public image of the nursing home industry 
has been tainted by issues such as financial fraud (Department of Justice, 2016a, 2016b), high 
staff turnover rates (Castle and Engberg, 2005), and increasingly complex corporate structures 
(Stevenson et al., 2013; Harrington et al., 2015). To address asymmetric information between 
consumers and providers, the federal government uses report cards as a policy tool to help 
consumers choose nursing homes and to improve quality of care in the nursing home industry. 
1.2.2 Use and design of report cards 
Public reporting for nursing homes has existed for almost two decades since it was first 
introduced in 1998. Nursing Home Compare (NHC), which is a web-based nursing home report 
card, was launched by CMS (then known as the Health Care Financing Administration) in 
October 1998. Initially, only a few facility-level structural characteristics and information on 
health inspections were reported. The nurse staffing measure was added after 2000. After 
experimenting in six pilot states for six months, CMS introduced the Nursing Home Quality 
Initiative (NHQI) nationally in November 2002. In this version of the report card, quality 
indicators were introduced in addition to the existing health inspection and staffing information. 
Most recently in December 2008, CMS launched a newly designed five-star quality rating 
system that translates detailed and fragmented measures into more simplified and summarized 
stars ranging from one to five stars, with a higher number of stars indicating better quality. 
The five-star quality rating system is one of the largest summary rating systems in the 
United States (Werner et al., 2016). The main goal of introducing this simplified summary rating 
system is to use straightforward and graphical information to better assist consumers in choosing 
nursing homes based on their needs. The star ratings are based on three components: health 
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inspection, staffing, and quality measures. For each of the three components, a nursing home is 
assigned a star rating based on its performance on that component. Then, a composite overall 
rating is calculated for each nursing home based on the star ratings in the three domains. Figure 
1.1 presents a screenshot of Nursing Home Compare with star ratings presented. The underlying 
measures used to calculate the star ratings come from several sources. Information on health 
inspections is collected by state inspectors and validated by federal agencies. Staffing and quality 
measures are largely based on nursing homes’ self-reported survey data and resident assessment 
data. 
1.3 Prior studies 
Most of the literature on the nursing home report card focused on its impact on consumer 
demand and quality of care. In general, the results have been modest and inconsistent. Stevenson 
(2006) reviewed the earlier literature and concluded that public reporting might experience more 
difficulties in promoting quality in nursing homes than for acute care settings. He argued that 
consumers’ lack of awareness or understanding of the information on the report card is one of the 
most important reasons why report cards may not work as intended in the nursing home industry. 
A majority of the literature evaluated the impacts of NHQI implementation in 2002. 
Werner et al. (2009a) used small nursing homes that were exempt from Nursing Home Compare 
as a control group to study the impact of public reporting on quality measures. They found small 
improvements in most of the reported quality measures but not in the broader unreported quality 
measures. Grabowski and Town (2011) found that NHC had a minimal impact on quality of care. 
However, nursing homes were more responsive in competitive markets. Werner et al. (2012) 
studied how choice of nursing homes was affected by public reporting and found minimal 
consumer response to information disclosure. 
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In addition to quality of care, patient sorting is another area of interest. Werner et al. 
(2011) examined changes in patient sorting and illness severity before and after NHC was 
implemented and found that public reporting improved patient matching to facilities. He and 
Konetzka (2015) examined demand rationing caused by public reporting and found that high-
quality nursing homes with capacity constraints reduced admissions of less profitable Medicaid 
residents while increasing Medicare and private-pay admissions. 
Only a few studies have evaluated the five-star rating system. Konetzka et al. (2015) found 
that the five-star rating system exacerbated disparities in quality of care by payer types. 
Specifically, dual-eligible residents who are qualified for both Medicare and Medicaid coverage 
had a substantially smaller likelihood of choosing high-quality homes, while non-dual-eligible 
residents experienced a larger shift toward highly rated nursing homes. Werner et al. (2016) 
applied a pre-post design to compare the impacts of the five-star rating system on consumer 
demand. Using data from 2005 to 2010, they found 5-star facilities gained more than 6% of their 
market share while 1-star facilities lost 8% after the new report card system was implemented. 
Overall, the current literature on nursing home report cards largely focused on direct and 
intended effects such as residents demand and quality of care. Much less attention has been paid 
to indirect effects such as financial performance for nursing homes, even though financial health 
is critically important for quality of care as well as nursing homes’ sustainability. Park et al. 
(2011) found that nursing homes had increased revenues and profit margins if they improved 
their publicly reported performance after the NHQI implementation. However, their study did 
not include a control group. Using data of nursing homes in Wisconsin from 2001 to 2003, 
Clement et al. (2012) found that low-quality nursing homes raised their prices by a small amount 
after the release of NHQI in 2002. Huang and Hirth (2016) used a pre-post design to analyze the 
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impact of nursing home five-star ratings on private prices of nursing homes located in five states. 
In contrast to Clement et al. (2012), they found that top-rated nursing homes were able to raise 
their private prices by 4.8% to 6% after implementation of the new star rating system. Using 
Virginia data in 2011, Clement and Khushalani (2015) did not find a significant association 
between overall five-star quality ratings and private prices. In a more recent study using the same 
data, Clement (2016) found that offering high-value long-term care services was unrelated to 
operating or total profit margin of nursing homes. 
Studies in the existing literature have several limitations. Many studies lack an appropriate 
control group, which leads to less plausible causal estimation. This issue is particularly relevant 
for studies evaluating the new five-star rating system because all nursing homes participated in 
the program at the same time and no control group was available. Furthermore, among the 
handful of finance-related studies, the lack of expense information (i.e., only look at the price 
effects) and limited study scope (e.g., only use nursing homes in a few states) may also 
contribute to the inconsistent results. Lastly, within the context of large-scale summary rating 
systems recently implemented across various industries in the healthcare sector, relevant 
empirical evidence is limited. 
This study aims to bridge the gap of the existing literature on the relationship between 
public reporting and financial performance of nursing homes by (1) exploiting the procedure of 
assigning the number of stars to tackle the empirical challenge of having no control group; (2) 
exploring one of the much less investigated yet important indirect effects ― financial 
performance; (3) incorporating costs as well as revenues to present a full picture of financial 
performance, and (4) including a nationally representative sample. 
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1.4 Theoretical framework 
Under the traditional and fragmented public reporting system, nursing homes may exploit 
the complexity and obscurity of the information presented in earlier versions of the report cards. 
For example, they might only make improvement on selected measures that are relatively easier 
to observe and readily understood by consumers (Werner et al., 2009a, 2009b; Mukamel et al., 
2010). However, with the release of the new five-star rating system, the graphical and more 
straightforward information has the potential for consumers to better differentiate nursing homes 
based on their star ratings. Although detailed information on the specific underlying measures 
may have been available even before the new five-star rating system was implemented, the 
addition of a simplified summary rating in the form of stars could increase consumer awareness 
and understanding of the report card, leading to a more elastic demand for nursing home services 
with respect to the reported quality. 
A simplified star rating system may help consumers better differentiate nursing homes 
based on star rating levels and therefore affect occupancy rates, private-pay prices, and payer 
mix of the facilities. First, nursing homes with higher star ratings may attract more consumers, 
leading to an increase in occupancy rates at these facilities. Second, high-performing nursing 
homes may choose to raise their prices for private-pay residents. In the nursing home industry, 
Medicare and Medicaid rates are administratively set by the federal and state governments. 
However, nursing homes could change their private-pay prices in response to changes in demand 
for their services. Third, higher-rated nursing homes may have a better payer mix of residents. 
For example, compared to lower-margin Medicaid residents who typically have fewer choices in 
nursing homes, higher-margin Medicare and private-pay residents often face fewer restrictions. 
In summary, these three possible effects due to differences in star ratings may lead to differences 
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in revenues for nursing homes. Therefore, I hypothesize that nursing homes with higher star 
ratings are more likely to generate higher revenues compared to lower-rated facilities. 
Compared to revenues, the relationship between star ratings and expenses could be more 
complicated. Highly rated nursing homes typically perform better on certain measures related to 
quality of care. If providing higher quality of care is costly or maintaining a higher star rating 
requires sustainable investment in quality improvement, nursing homes with higher ratings could 
see an increase in costs. For example, improving nurse staffing ratios requires the hiring of more 
nurses, which would result in higher expenses. In addition, if higher-rated nursing homes attract 
more Medicare and private-pay residents but they also require more resources to provide 
appropriate care, costs may increase as well. On the other hand, nursing homes with higher star 
ratings may have better quality management with more efficient operations. For example, 
nursing homes could reduce costs while improving quality of care by limiting the use of physical 
restraints. In support of these theoretical arguments, existing empirical evidence showed that the 
relationship between quality of care and costs was mixed (Hussey et al., 2013). Therefore, I 
hypothesize that the star rating effect on costs is ambiguous. In addition, because profit margins 
are determined by both revenues and costs, as a result, the effect of an increase in star ratings on 
profit margins is ambiguous depending on whether the increase in revenues is offset by the 
possible increase in costs. 
Furthermore, market competition could modify the relationship between star ratings and 
financial performance. Disclosure of quality information might have little effect on financial 
performance of facilities located in areas with limited competition. Residents would have limited 
choices in these markets. In addition, nursing homes would be less incentivized to improve their 
performance due to the inelastic demand with respect to quality in more concentrated markets. In 
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more competitive markets, the elasticity of demand with respect to quality could increase, 
leading to potentially stronger revenue effects of the report card. Moreover, economic theory 
suggests that costs would change in similar magnitudes as do revenues in more competitive 
markets in the long run. For example, in equilibrium (and perfect competition), costs would 
balance the revenues. Existing research supported the argument that market concentration might 
play an important role mediating the effects of public reporting in the nursing home industry 
(Grabowski and Town, 2011; Huang and Hirth, 2016). Therefore, I expect the financial impacts 
of star ratings on nursing homes to be stronger in more competitive markets. 
In summary, I hypothesize that higher-rated nursing homes generate higher revenues than 
do lower-rated facilities. The difference in costs between higher- and lower-rated nursing homes 
is unclear. Accordingly, the effects of star ratings on profit margins are ambiguous. In general, 
the effects of star ratings on the financial performance of nursing homes are expected to be 
stronger in more competitive markets. In addition, to explore the mechanisms through which star 
ratings affect the financial performance, I expect occupancy rates and the proportion of private-
pay or Medicare residents to be higher in higher-rated nursing homes. 
1.5 Data 
1.5.1 Star ratings 
Information on five-star quality ratings for all Medicare/Medicaid certified nursing homes 
is downloaded from the NHC website. In addition, to complement the star rating data and 
accommodate the empirical strategy of this study, through a special request to CMS, I obtain 
unpublished data including detailed information on underlying health inspection scores and 
relevant thresholds used to assign the number of stars for nursing homes. 
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The NHC website maintains archived data documenting the overall rating as well as 
specific ratings for each Medicare/Medicaid certified nursing home in three domains: health 
inspection, staffing, and quality. For this study, I extract the detailed rating information for each 
nursing home in October of each year from 2008 to 2013. On average, there are about 15,453 
nursing homes with their star rating information available each year. 
1.5.2 Financial performance 
The Medicare Cost Reports (MCRs) for skilled nursing facilities (CMS-2540-96 for fiscal 
years before 2010; CMS-2540-10 for fiscal years 2010 or later) from 2009 to 2014 are used to 
extract financial information. Each year, every Medicare-certified nursing home is required to 
file its cost report in order to receive Medicare reimbursements. The report includes detailed 
financial information such as revenues and expenses at the facility level. More specifically, the 
financial measures are drawn from the Statement of Revenues and Expenses (Worksheet G3). 
Consistent with previous studies that used the MCRs data, I use operating revenues, 
operating expenses, and operating profit margins to evaluate nursing homes’ overall financial 
performance. Operating revenues are defined as the total revenues related to direct patient care, 
excluding any contractual allowances and discounts or incomes from investment or donations. 
Operating expenses are costs related to direct patient care. Operating profit margin is derived as 
operating profits (operating revenues less operating costs) divided by the operating revenues. To 
standardize the measures across nursing homes of varying sizes, I divide the financial measures 
by the number of total resident days (Worksheet S-3) in a calendar year. In line with previous 
studies on nursing home financial performance (Bowblis and Brunt, 2014; Bowblis, 2015), the 
analytical sample is limited to nursing homes with a fiscal year starting on or after January 1st 
and ending on or before December 31st of the same calendar year, with a reporting period that is 
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equal to or longer than 360 days. This sample selection strategy is adopted because some factors 
such as wage index or base payment rates could be changed annually. To adjust for inflation, the 
annual consumer price index extracted from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics is used to 
convert all the dollar values to 2014 dollars.  
The MCR is well known for having outliers due to reporting errors (Kane and Magnus, 
2001; Government Accountability Office, 2016). A golden standard to precisely detect those 
outliers does not exist but previous research on the financial performance of nursing homes 
adopted a relatively consistent approach to address this issue. In this study, I follow the previous 
literature (Bowblis, 2015; Huang and Hirth, 2016) and drop observations with missing or 
negative values in revenues and expenses where values should be positive. In addition, the 
observations at the top and bottom 1% values based on operating profit margins are dropped. To 
account for the skewness of the financial measures, the natural logs of operating revenues and 
operating expenses are used in the analysis. 
1.5.3 Control variables 
A set of control variables including facility-level structural measures and residents’ 
demographic characteristics that could affect financial outcomes for nursing homes are obtained 
from OSCAR and the LTCfocus.org website from 2008 through 2013. Every 9 to 15 months, 
each federally certified nursing home receives an onsite inspection conducted by state agencies. 
Including a rich set of information on facilities’ structural and staffing measures collected from 
these inspections, the OSCAR file represents approximately 96% of all nursing homes in the 
United States. Specifically, ownership status (i.e., for profit, not-for-profit), chain status, number 
of beds, occupancy rate, Activities of Daily Living (ADL) index, and payer mix variables are 
obtained from the OSCAR file. I use the total number of beds and county information to 
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construct a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) by accounting for chain affiliations (Hirth et al., 
2017) to measure market competition at the county level. Residents’ demographic characteristics 
including age, gender, and race are extracted from the LTC focus, which gathers aggregated data 
from a variety of sources such as OSCAR and nursing home residents’ assessment data. 
1.5.4 Creation of analytical dataset 
The study period is from 2008 to 2013, after the five-star quality rating system was 
implemented in 2008. The four datasets are linked using the unique federal provider 
identification number for each nursing home and year information. Hospital-based nursing 
homes are excluded because they often have a very different patient mix and severity compared 
to typical nursing facilities, and their financial information is embedded in their affiliated 
hospitals’ cost reports. For similar reasons, government-owned nursing homes are excluded as 
well. In addition, nursing homes located in Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia are 
excluded because the data are not complete for these states. The analytical sample includes an 
average of 8,656 nursing homes each year from 2008 to 2013. 
1.6 Empirical strategy 
1.6.1 Regression discontinuity 
Whereas most previous studies of the nursing home report cards used data from both pre- 
and post- periods, this study relies on the data after the five-star quality rating system was 
implemented because this new rating system was rolled out for all nursing homes at the same 
time in 2008, and therefore no control group existed before its implementation. A naive model 
that simply regresses financial measures on star ratings could potentially yield biased estimates 
due to the possible endogeneity of star ratings. For example, a nursing home that faces strong 
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demand due to its high quality might already have had higher revenues even in the absence of a 
higher star rating. In addition, the lack of an appropriate control group could cause bias in 
evaluating the impact of report cards. To address these issues, I implement a regression 
discontinuity (RD) design by taking advantage of recovering the true underlying continuous 
quality scores and relevant thresholds used to assign the number of stars for nursing homes. 
More specifically, I separately estimate the financial performance of nursing homes rated near 
the four cutoff points across the five star ratings over the period from 2008 to 2013. 
First introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) and recently formalized by 
economists (Hahn et al., 2001; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010), the RD 
design is widely seen as a rigorous non-experimental approach to estimate treatment effects. The 
rating methodology provides a plausibly exogenous variation for nursing homes close to the 
thresholds between the scores used to assign stars. For example, two similar nursing homes 
ranked closely around the threshold of a star rating would be assigned a different number of stars 
depending whether their scores are slightly below or above the threshold. With the increasingly 
widespread implementation of simplified summary ratings across different sectors including 
healthcare, researchers have used RD designs with data from Yelp.com (Luca, 2011; Anderson 
and Magruder, 2012), dialysis facilities (Ramanarayanan and Snyder, 2012), and Medicare 
Advantage plans (Darden and McCarthy, 2015). 
The RD design is similar to a randomized controlled trial but limits the study sample to a 
relatively narrower bandwidth around the thresholds. In this study, if the assignment into one 
additional star is random for nursing homes with underlying scores close to the threshold and 
other covariates are smooth across the threshold, the difference in financial performance if any 
should be attributed only to the discontinuous change in star ratings. 
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1.6.2 Assignment of star ratings 
To better illustrate why the RD design fits this study, I detail the procedure of star 
assignment for nursing homes. As mentioned in Section 1.2.2, each nursing home on the NHC 
website is assigned a star rating in each of three domains: health inspection, staffing, and quality. 
In addition, an overall rating is calculated based on a nursing home’s comprehensive 
performance in these three domains. However, because staffing and quality ratings are largely 
based on self-reported measures, the health inspection domain carries the most weight in the 
construction of the overall star rating. Specifically, the calculation of the overall rating starts 
from the health inspection rating. 
Subsequently, a nursing home receives one additional star if its staffing rating is higher 
than three stars and greater than its health inspection star rating, but the facility gets one star 
subtracted if the staffing rating is only one star. Next, the resulting overall rating receives one 
additional star only if the quality rating is five stars, but one star gets subtracted if the quality 
rating is one only star. If the health inspection rating is one star, the overall rating cannot be 
changed by more than one star based on staffing and quality components. The overall star rating 
cannot be more than five stars or fewer than one star. If a nursing home receives no health 
inspection rating because it is too new to be rated, the facility does not receive an overall rating 
either. 
This hierarchical procedure of assigning the overall rating illustrates the dominant role of 
health inspection rating in the calculation of the overall rating. Next, I detail the procedure of 
how a nursing home’s health inspection rating is determined because it is important for the RD 
design in this study. 
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To become certified by Medicare or Medicaid, each nursing home is required to receive a 
standard onsite health inspection enforced by the local state agency every 9 to 15 months. A 
typical inspection lasts several days during which the inspection team assesses whether the 
nursing home is in compliance with hundreds of federal regulations ranging from detailed care 
process for its residents to kitchen/food services and safety. Numerical points are assigned to 
each health inspection violation based on its scope and severity. The total health inspection score 
for a nursing home is calculated based on its most recent three health inspection surveys, 
additional deficiencies from the most recent three calendar years of any complaint-based surveys 
that were conducted in addition to the regular surveys, and the number of revisits required to 
correct the violations. More recent surveys are given larger weights in the calculation of the total 
health inspection score. More specifically, the score from the most recent survey is assigned a 
weighting factor of 1/2, the score from the previous survey has a weighting factor of 1/3, and the 
score based on the second prior survey has a weighting factor of 1/6. A higher health inspection 
score indicates more severe quality issues. 
On the NHC website, each nursing home is assigned an integer health inspection rating 
that ranges from 1 to 5 stars based on its percentile ranking of health inspection scores among all 
nursing homes within the same state. The top 10% of nursing homes receive 5 stars and the 
bottom 20% get only 1 star. The middle 70% of the nursing homes receive 2 to 4 stars with an 
equal interval between each star. In general, the ratings for all nursing homes are updated 
monthly. However, the rating for any given facility is held constant until there is a change in the 
health inspection score for that facility. 
On the NHC website, both the overall and domain-specific star ratings are displayed for 
each nursing home. However, as shown in Figure 1.1, the display of the overall rating is more 
 18 
prominent on the first line under the name of each nursing home. Therefore, consumers and 
nursing homes are likely to pay more attention to the overall ratings. Earlier studies on the new 
five-star system also focused on the overall ratings (Konetzka et al. 2015; Grabowski et al. 2016; 
Werner et al. 2016; Williams et al. 2016). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the overall 
rating plays the most important role across all domains in general. 
For this study, I follow the previous studies and use the overall star rating for nursing 
homes. However, even though the overall star rating is largely determined by the health 
inspection domain, nursing homes with extreme staffing and/or quality ratings could receive 
overall star ratings that are different from their health inspection ratings. If the overall rating of a 
nursing home equals its health inspection rating, the thresholds in the health inspection domain 
determine the number of stars for both the health inspection and overall domains. From the 
perspective of the RD identification, a sample of nursing homes with health inspection ratings 
that equal the overall ratings accommodates the design well. On the other hand, the issue of 
generalizability arises when using this group of nursing homes. To address this concern, I 
compare the characteristics of all nursing homes and the nursing homes with overall ratings that 
equal their health inspection ratings. Table A1 shows the summary statistics for these two 
groups. As shown, the preferred sample accounts for slightly more than 50% of the full sample. 
However, all characteristics are extremely similar between the two groups of nursing homes, 
which alleviates the concern about the generalizability of the results using the preferred sample. 
1.6.3 Main empirical model 
Because there are five integer star ratings ranging from 1 to 5 stars, four thresholds are 
used to assign the number of stars to each nursing home. Instead of estimating a pooled RD 
treatment effect of one additional star increase using all nursing homes closed to the thresholds, I 
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consider the potential heterogenous effects of each star threshold (Cattaneo et al., 2016). More 
specifically, I separately estimate the effects of obtaining an additional star on nursing homes’ 
financial performance for each of the four thresholds. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), by 
limiting the sample to a narrow bandwidth ℎ to the left and right of the threshold, the main 
specification for each of the four thresholds is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼(𝑅𝑖𝑡 > 𝑅?̂?) + 𝛽2?̃?𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼(𝑅𝑖𝑡 > 𝑅?̂?) × ?̃?𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
 (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡+1 is the financial measure of interest for nursing home 𝑖 in year 𝑡 + 1; 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the 
underlying health inspection score used to assign a given star rating to nursing home 𝑖 in year 𝑡; 
𝑅?̂? is the cutoff score between two adjacent star ratings in year 𝑡; 𝐼(∙) is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 if nursing home 𝑖 gets one additional star (e.g., 𝑅𝑖𝑡 > 𝑅?̂?) and 0 otherwise; 
?̃?𝑖𝑡 is the centered score variable that equals the difference between the underlying score of 
nursing home 𝑖 and the cutoff score; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of time-varying covariates that may affect 
financial outcomes; 𝛿𝑡 is a set of year dummies to control for year trends; 𝜃𝑠 is the state fixed 
effect to account for the possible state variation in health inspection procedure; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the 
random error term for nursing home 𝑖. Including the interaction term between 𝐼(∙) and ?̃?𝑖𝑡 helps 
account for the fact that stars may affect not only the intercept but also the slope of the regression 
lines to both sides of the thresholds. Standard errors are clustered within each nursing home to 
account for potential auto-correlation of the errors. In this specification, 𝛽1 is the coefficient of 
interest, which indicates the impact of one additional star due to the discontinuity around cutoff 
points, conditioning on the continuous health inspection score of each nursing home. I allow for 
a one-year lag between the star rating and the financial outcomes because it would take time for 
nursing home and consumer responses to the rating to affect financial outcomes. 
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As discussed in Section 1.4, a change in financial performance could come from several 
possible sources. Therefore, I further explore the mechanisms of the rating effects if any. 
Specifically, I examine whether a discontinuous change in star ratings would cause a change in 
occupancy rates or patient sorting along the payer mix dimension (e.g., higher-rated nursing 
homes attract more residents with favorable payers). In these analyses, I run the same RD 
regression by replacing financial outcomes with payer mix or occupancy rates. 
To test the role of market competition, I break up the main analysis of the effects of star 
thresholds on financial outcomes by market competition levels. More specifically, using the 
guidelines from the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (DOJ and FTC, 
2010), I conduct separate RD analyses for two types of markets: more competitive markets 
where HHIs are equal to or smaller than 2,500, and less competitive markets where HHIs are 
larger than 2,500. 
1.6.4 Internal validity 
Although the RD design is appealing for establishing the plausible causal inference, 
several factors should be examined to support the internal validity of the design. In this section, I 
discuss these threats and propose how to test them empirically. 
1.1.1.1 Manipulation 
One common concern with the RD design is the incentive for observations around the 
threshold to precisely manipulate their probabilities of receiving treatment. If nursing homes had 
the ability to change their quality scores around the threshold, the assumption of random 
distribution above and below the threshold would be violated and so would be the RD design. 
However, this is unlikely to occur in the setting of this study. First, health inspections are 
conducted objectively by state inspectors and verified by the federal agency. This is also one of 
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the reasons why I use health inspection ratings but not staffing or quality measures, which are 
subject to self-reporting issues. Indeed, one of the biggest criticisms of the five-star rating system 
is nursing homes’ ability to self-report staffing or quality measures to improve ratings (Thomas, 
2014). Second, the health inspection score of a nursing home is a weighted score based on its 
health inspection records in the past three years. It is implausible for a nursing home to precisely 
manipulate its scores for multiple years. Third, the health inspection rating is based on the 
distribution of health inspection scores for nursing homes within a state. Even if a nursing home 
somehow could manipulate its own health inspection scores, the facility would also need to 
know the health inspection scores for all other nursing homes within the same state to calculate 
its own percentile ranking. Therefore, it is implausible for a nursing home to manipulate its own 
position along the whole distribution. For these reasons, the identification assumption of the RD 
design in the setting of this study is theoretically conceivable. 
To empirically rule out the possibility of nursing homes’ precise manipulation of health 
inspection ratings, I conduct a density test proposed by McCrary (2008) for each of the four 
thresholds. Visually, this is a graph that plots the number of observations at each point along the 
health inspection percentile rankings. If there was no manipulation, there should be no 
discontinuity in the number of observations around the threshold. 
1.1.1.2 Covariates 
As shown in the main specification (1), a set of covariates that may also affect financial 
outcomes are included. However, these covariates should, in theory, not be affected by the 
differences in the number of stars. Like a well-implemented randomized control trial, when 
designed appropriately, the treatment and control groups in the RD design should look similar 
along the baseline characteristics. I compare nursing homes’ structural measures and residents’ 
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demographic characteristics between the treatment and control groups to analyze whether they 
are balanced around the thresholds. In addition, to empirically test the smoothness across the 
thresholds, I regress each of these covariates as a dependent variable with specification (1). If the 
RD design is valid, there should be no observed discontinuity around the star threshold for any of 
these covariates. 
1.1.1.3 Bandwidth selection and functional form 
For the main analysis, I start with a bandwidth of 5 percentile points below and above each 
star threshold. However, it is necessary to test the sensitivity of the results by varying the 
bandwidth selections. A larger bandwidth is more likely to yield more precise estimates because 
more observations would be included, while a smaller bandwidth may generate more noise 
because fewer observations are included. Specifically, I vary the bandwidth selections from 2.5 
to 7.5 percentile points with increments of 0.5 to examine the robustness of the estimations to 
each alternative bandwidth. In addition, based on the idea of mean square error (MSE), more 
formal procedures to choose an optimal bandwidth have been used in RD designs. Following 
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and Calonico et al. (2014), I implement an optimal bandwidth 
selection procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2017) to generate the MSE-optimal bandwidths 
around each of the star thresholds. I then compare the point estimates based on these alternative 
bandwidths to test the robustness of the results. 
In addition, the main specification is a local linear regression model. Even though it is 
recommended that a local linear model should be used (Hahn et al., 2001; Imbens and Lemieux, 
2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010) in an RD design with a narrow bandwidth, I test whether the 
main results are robust to alternative functional forms such as quadratic and cubic polynomials. 
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1.7 Results 
1.7.1 Main results 
Table 1.1 presents the characteristics of the nursing homes by overall star ratings from 
2008 to 2013. In general, all three financial measures increase as the number of stars increases, 
except for nursing homes with two or three stars. For example, operating revenue per patient day 
increases from $244 for an average 1-star nursing home to about $320 for an average 5-star 
nursing home. Similarly, on average, operating cost per patient day increases from $241 for 1-
star nursing homes to $313 for those with a 5-star rating. The average operating profit margin is 
relatively low across all nursing homes, ranging from 0.01 for 1-star nursing homes to 0.03 for 5-
star facilities. 
In terms of ownership mix, both the proportions of chain-affiliated and for-profit nursing 
homes decrease as the number of stars increases. In addition, nursing homes with higher star 
ratings have fewer beds, higher occupancy rates, slightly higher ADL index scores, and more 
Medicare but fewer Medicaid residents. In terms of residents’ demographic characteristics, 
higher-rated nursing homes have more residents who are female, white, and of older age. On 
average, nursing homes across the star ratings operate in relatively competitive markets, with 
county HHIs ranging from 1,833 to 2,080. 
The characteristics presented in Table 1.1 provides a general picture for all nursing homes 
in the sample. In contrast to other empirical approaches, the RD design focuses on and compares 
nursing homes with underlying scores that are close to the star thresholds. Table 1.2 compares 
the covariates for nursing homes with health inspection scores that are 5 percentile points above 
and below the threshold of each star. As shown, most of the covariates are well balanced across 
these thresholds. The good comparability of the characteristics between nursing homes with 
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similar health inspection scores but different star ratings provide support for the validity of the 
RD design in this study. 
One of the advantages of RD design is its graphical presentation by simply plotting the 
variables of interest against the underlying score variable. In Figure 1.2, I plot the overall star 
rating against the continuous percentile rankings based on health inspection scores for nursing 
homes from 2008 to 2013 in the analytical sample. By design, there is a sharp discontinuity from 
0 to 1 on the probability of receiving one additional star at each of the four thresholds used to 
assign the number of stars. 
Next, I present a set of plots for raw means of financial measures against the continuous 
percentile rankings for nursing homes between 2008 and 2013. Figure 1.3 shows the relationship 
between nursing homes’ operating revenue per patient day at year t+1 and their percentile 
rankings based on health inspection scores at year t for each of the four thresholds used to assign 
stars. The top panel includes figures for 5-star and 4-star thresholds from left to right, while the 
bottom panel presents figures for 3-star and 2-star thresholds from left to right, respectively. 
There is a discontinuous jump from approximately $300 to $320 on the operating revenue per 
patient day between 4-star and 5-star nursing homes across the 5-star threshold. In contrast, the 
operating revenues per patient day smoothly cross the other three thresholds without significant 
discontinuity. 
Similarly, Figure 1.4 presents the relationship between nursing homes’ operating expense 
per patient day and their percentile rankings based on the health inspection scores. The expense 
pattern is very similar to that of the revenue shown in Figure 1.3. Across the 5-star threshold, the 
average operating expense per patient day jumps from about $290 for 4-star nursing homes just 
below the threshold to slightly over $310 for 5-star nursing homes just above the threshold. In 
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general, nursing homes’ operating expenses per patient day smoothly cross the other three star’s 
thresholds. Given the similar patterns in Figures 3A and 3B, it is not surprising that there is no 
discontinuous change in operating profit margins around the threshold for any star as shown in 
Figure 1.5. These scatterplots foreshadow the formal RD estimates. 
Table 1.3 presents the results from the main RD estimates using a local linear regression as 
shown in specification (1) with a bandwidth of 5 percentile points around each of the four 
thresholds. The model controls for a set of facility-level time-varying covariates, state fixed 
effects, and year trends. The star ratings show heterogeneous effects on the financial 
performance of nursing homes depending on the thresholds. Both the revenue and cost effects 
are statistically significant (p < .05) among nursing homes with health inspection scores around 
thresholds of 2 and 5 stars but not for nursing homes with scores that are close around thresholds 
of 3 or 4 stars. However, no significant effect is observed for nursing homes’ profit margins 
across any of the four thresholds. Specifically, the operating revenue per patient day of 5-star 
nursing homes is about 5.1% higher (p < .05) than that of nearly identical facilities with 4 stars. 
However, these 5-star nursing homes just above the threshold also incur higher operating 
expense per patient day (p < .05) by about 4.4%, compared to their 4-star counterparts. Because 
these nursing homes with 5 stars not only generate higher operating revenues but also incur 
higher operating expenses in a similar magnitude, no statistically significant higher operating 
profit margins are observed compared to 4-star facilities just below the threshold. Similarly, the 
operating revenue per patient day and cost per patient day of 2-star nursing homes are 3.4% (p < 
.05) and 3.9% (p < .05) higher, respectively, than those of 1-star nursing homes. Again, no profit 
margin effect is observed for nursing home around the 2-star threshold. 
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1.7.2 Bandwidth selection and functional form 
To test the robustness of the main results to different bandwidth selections around the 
thresholds, I apply a variety of bandwidth options ranging between 2.5 and 7.5 percentile points 
in increments of 0.5 to the left and right of each threshold. The full results are shown in Tables 
A2 through A5. To briefly summarize, the effects of the 5-star threshold on revenues and costs 
consistently remain statistically significant for all alternative bandwidth selections. However, the 
effects of the 2-star threshold on both revenues and costs become insignificant as the bandwidth 
shrinks to 4 or smaller percentile points. The effects of 3-star and 4-star thresholds remain 
statistically insignificant for any bandwidth selection. The effects on profit margin are 
insignificant across the star thresholds with any bandwidth. 
In addition, I implement an MSE-optimal bandwidth selection procedure to find the 
appropriate bandwidths for each of the star thresholds. The resulting optimal bandwidths and 
associated point estimates are reported in Table A6. The suggested optimal bandwidths around 
each star threshold are all close to 5 percentile points. In addition, although the optimal 
bandwidths slightly differ across the thresholds, both the magnitudes and statistical significances 
of the point estimates are quantitatively close to the main results using the 5 percentile points 
across the thresholds. 
Next, I test the robustness of the point estimates from the main results to alternative 
functional forms including a model with no covariates, a quadratic model, and a cubic model in 
addition to the local linear model. Tables A7 to A10 show the results from these models for each 
of the star threshold. Overall, the results are consistent across different functional forms. 
Therefore, following the recommendations by previous literature on the RD design (Hahn et al., 
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2001; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Gelman and Imbens, 2014), I use the 
local linear regression throughout this study. 
1.7.3 Possible mechanisms 
The main results suggest that the number of stars has significant effects on both revenues 
and costs for nursing homes with scores close to the 5-star and 2-star thresholds but not the 
middle star levels. However, the effects of 2-star threshold are sensitive to the bandwidth 
selections. Furthermore, due to the similar magnitudes of star effects on both revenues and costs, 
there is no significant star effect on nursing homes’ operating profit margins across the four 
thresholds. As suggested in Section 1.4, several mechanisms may help explain the main findings. 
Specifically, I explore the roles of payer mix and occupancy rates in mediating the relationship 
between star ratings and nursing homes’ financial performance. 
To examine the relationship between star ratings and payer mix of nursing homes, I run the 
RD local linear regression by replacing financial outcomes with payer mix variables. Table 1.4 
shows the results. Compared to 4-star facilities, 5-star nursing homes have a higher proportion of 
private-pay residents by 1.49 percentage points (p < .10) and lower shares of Medicare and 
Medicaid residents by 0.47 and 1.02 percentage points insignificantly. Similarly, the proportion 
of private-pay residents in 2-star nursing homes is also higher by 1.49 percentage points (p < .10) 
compared to that in 1-star nursing homes. Similar to the main results of revenues and costs, there 
is no statistically significant shift in payer mix for nursing homes with two middle-star ratings. 
This suggestive evidence implies that a higher proportion of private-pay residents may partially 
contribute to the higher revenues for both 2-star and 5-star nursing homes compared to their 
counterpart facilities but with one fewer star. 
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Next, I examine the relationship between star ratings and occupancy rates. The results are 
reported in Table 1.5. Both 2-star and 5-star nursing homes have higher occupancy rates than 
their lower-rated counterparts, but the point estimates are not significantly different from zero. 
Interestingly, the average occupancy rate of 4-star nursing homes is 2.73 percentage points (p < 
.01) higher than that of 3-star nursing homes. However, as shown in the main RD results, around 
the 4-star threshold, 4-star nursing homes do not gain higher revenues than their 3-star 
counterparts. In addition, the results on payer mix analysis suggest that 4-star nursing homes may 
attract more Medicaid residents than 3-star facilities, although the effect is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, the star rating effects on occupancy rates and payer mix of 4-star nursing 
homes offset each other, resulting in an insignificant star effect on the revenues of these 
facilities. 
1.7.4 Role of market competition 
As previously stated, the effects of star ratings on financial outcomes could be 
heterogeneous depending on the level of market competition. I examine the role of market 
competition by conducting the same RD analysis using sub-samples stratified by the levels of 
market competition (i.e., nursing homes located in more competitive markets [HHI ≤ 2,500] and 
less competitive markets [HHI > 2,500]). Table 1.6 presents the results. Not surprisingly, the 
main effects of star ratings on financial outcomes are concentrated among nursing homes in more 
competitive markets. For example, in more competitive markets, 5-star nursing homes not only 
generate higher revenues by 7.2% (p < .05) but also incur higher costs by 6.3% (p < .05) 
compared to their 4-star counterparts. However, the effects of the 5-star threshold in less 
competitive markets are imprecise statistically. Similarly, the effects of the other three thresholds 
in more competitive markets are consistent with the main results as shown in Table 1.3. In 
 29 
addition, the effects of star ratings on profit margins remain insignificant across all star 
thresholds regardless of market competition levels. 
1.7.5 Change in star ratings 
One of the empirical challenges of this study is the timing between rating and financial 
measures. As stated earlier, nursing home ratings are generally updated once a month. The 
independent variable used in this study is the star ratings for each October from 2008 to 2013. 
Although a nursing home’s rating does not change until new data become available for that 
facility, it is still possible that ratings in October are different from those in the other months 
until the next October. In those cases, it would cause complications to disentangle the rating 
effect on the financial performance of nursing homes. To address this concern, I restrict the 
sample to nursing homes without changed ratings and run the RD local linear regression. The 
results are shown in Table 1.7. The main effects of the star ratings clearly come from the nursing 
homes without rating changes within one year. For example, among the nursing homes with 
persistent star ratings, compared to their 4-star counterparts, the 5-star nursing homes generate 
higher operating revenues by approximately 9.7% (p < .01) but incur higher operating costs by 
9.4% (p < .01). The profit margins are not affected by differences in the number of star ratings. 
The results on other thresholds are also consistent with the main results as shown in Table 1.3. 
1.7.6 Robustness checks 
In addition to showing the robustness of the main results to a variety of bandwidth 
selections and different functional forms in Section 1.7.2, I conduct two additional analyses to 
examine the internal validity of the RD design for this study. First, as stated previously, one 
important assumption for the RD design to be valid is that observations cannot precisely 
manipulate the assignment of the treatment. In Section 1.6.4.1, I detail the procedures for star 
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assignment and the implausibility for a nursing home to precisely manipulate its score to obtain 
an additional star. To complement these arguments, following McCrary (2008), I conduct a 
formal density test of nursing homes with scores around the threshold of each star. Figure A1 
shows the results. The density of nursing homes around each star threshold is not discontinuous 
because none of the changes in density of nursing homes at any star threshold is statistically 
significant. 
Another important assumption for a valid RD design is that the only discontinuity around 
the thresholds comes from the dependent variables of interest but not from other covariates. As 
previously shown in Table 1.2, most of the covariates are similar across each threshold. To 
further test the smoothness of these covariates across the star thresholds, I estimate the RD local 
linear regressions with each of the covariates as the dependent variable. Table A11 reports the 
results from this robustness check. None of the covariates is significantly affected by the star 
thresholds. 
1.7.7 Falsification test 
Furthermore, to test the robustness of the findings in this study, I empirically evaluate the 
relationship between star ratings and financial performance of nursing homes with a false 
implementation year. Through a special request to CMS, I obtain health inspection records for all 
nursing homes in the United States between 2005 and 2007 to calculate the would-be health 
inspection scores for nursing homes in 2007, which is one year before the five-star quality rating 
system was implemented. All detailed health inspection data were publicly available on the NHC 
website before 2008; however, there was no rating system in place at that time. Therefore, I can 
use the health inspection data in earlier years to calculate each nursing home’s health inspection 
score and its percentile ranking within the state based on the published CMS algorithm and 
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assign a star rating to each nursing home. Then, I use the same RD design to test whether there is 
any jump around the cutoff points. If there is no jump, the main findings would be supported. 
Figures A2 through A4 show the plots of financial measures in 2008 against the 
continuous percentile rankings based on weighted health inspection scores in 2007. There is no 
significant jump in financial outcomes around any star threshold. To more formally test this, I 
run the RD local linear regressions with the bandwidth of 5 percentile points around each 
threshold. The results are shown in Table A12. None of the star rating coefficients on any of the 
financial outcomes is statistically significant, which confirms the random distribution of financial 
outcomes around each of the thresholds that are shown in the Figures A2 through A4. By 
showing evidence that presenting the same quality information but without stars does not affect 
any of the financial measures in the year prior to 2008, this falsification test reassures that the 
significant and robust effects of 5-star threshold on operating revenues and costs are plausibly 
due to the five-star quality rating system that was implemented after 2008. 
1.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
Public report cards such as the five-star quality rating system for nursing homes are 
designed to alleviate information asymmetries so that consumers can choose healthcare providers 
of better quality and providers are motivated to improve their quality of care. However, quality 
improvement often comes with increased costs. In the nursing home industry, the majority of 
nursing homes are for-profit facilities. From a provider’s perspective, it is critically important to 
ensure that any quality improvement is a sustainable practice long term. Whether providers are 
rewarded financially for performing well in report cards is an empirical question that is still 
relatively less investigated in prior studies focusing on the nursing home industry. 
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In this study, I evaluate the effects of the five-star quality rating system on nursing homes’ 
financial performance from 2008 to 2013. Unlike most previous research on nursing home report 
cards, this study focuses on the format of the new five-star quality rating system and explores the 
heterogeneity in the information that is presented in the report card. Specifically, I exploit the 
procedures to assign star ratings, recover the underlying quality scores used to assign stars, and 
implement an RD design to establish a plausible causal relationship between star ratings and 
financial performance for nursing homes that are at the margin of the thresholds used to assign 
the number of stars. 
I find that the number of stars has a significant effect on revenues and costs for nursing 
homes around the thresholds of 2 stars and 5 stars, but not for facilities around the middle-star 
thresholds. Specifically, 5-star nursing homes with inspection scores just above the threshold 
gain operating revenues per patient day by about 5.1% (p < .05) higher than their 4-star 
counterparts with inspection scores just below the threshold. However, this group of 5-star 
nursing homes also incur higher operating expenses per patient day by about 4.4% (p < .05) 
compared to otherwise similar 4-star facilities. Similarly, the operating revenues and costs of 2-
star nursing homes are 3.4% (p < .05) and 3.9% (p < .05) higher than those of their nearly 
identical 1-star counterparts. However, in terms of profit margins, I do not find significant star 
effects for any group of nursing homes. The significant effects of the 5-star threshold are robust 
to a variety of bandwidth selections and different functional forms but the effects of the 2-star 
threshold become insignificant when the bandwidth is narrower around the threshold. Upon 
further investigation, the significantly higher revenues for nursing homes with scores just above 
the 2-star or 5-star thresholds are mainly due to a shift in payer mix, which is reflected by an 
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increase in the proportion of private-pay residents. In addition, the effects of star ratings are 
stronger in more competitive markets. 
In general, the findings of this study contribute to the existing literature on public reporting 
in the nursing home industry. They also complement existing studies that focused on the new 
five-star quality rating system. Huang and Hirth (2016) found that the private prices of top-
ranked nursing homes are 4.8% to 6% higher than those of lower-rated homes. In another study, 
Werner et al. (2016) concluded that the rating system significantly increased the demand for 
higher-rated nursing homes but decreased the demand for lower-rated facilities. The new five-
star quality rating system was also found to increase the disparity between dual- and non-dual-
eligible residents in accessing nursing homes with better star ratings (Konetzka et al., 2015). In 
an earlier study (Grabowski and Town, 2011), nursing homes facing stronger competition were 
found to improve their quality more than facilities in less competitive markets. To some extent, 
this study confirms these findings by prior work. In addition, this study emphasizes the important 
role of how information is presented in the report card and shows that it matters, at least among 
the top-rated nursing homes. 
An increase in revenues in response to a higher rating is not surprising. However, the 
finding of a similar magnitude of increased expenses and thus no significant profit effect fills the 
gap to previous studies that focused only on price effects. Even though the overall relationship 
between cost and quality of care could be positive (Gertler and Waldman, 1992), the 
discontinuous jump in costs around the 5-star threshold is puzzling. There are four possible 
explanations from different perspectives for this increase in costs. First, the jump in costs implies 
that it is costly for 5-star nursing homes to provide high quality of care to additional private-pay 
residents even though their payment rates are higher. Indeed, nursing home care requires 
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intensive labor input. For example, highly rated nursing homes need higher staffing levels as 
well as appropriate medical equipment to ensure that their residents receive high quality of care. 
Second, in the field of corporate finance, the pecking-order model of financing hierarchy (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984) predicts that firm managers tend to have a preference ranking over financing 
sources, which typically starts with internal funds, followed by debt, and then equity. The 
creation of this preference is mainly due to the information asymmetry between managers and 
investors. Within the context of this study, increased revenues due to higher star ratings may help 
relieving nursing homes’ financial constraints. For example, those 5-star nursing homes with 
scores that are just above the threshold may use extra revenues to enhance staffing levels and 
improve amenities so that they can maintain a competitive advantage, which lead to an increase 
in costs. Similarly, from the behavioral economics perspective, nursing homes with scores that 
are just above the thresholds may have a tendency toward loss aversion. These nursing homes 
could have stronger motivations to invest in quality improvement and to maintain a higher rating 
status because they are more afraid of lowering their star ratings. Lastly, from the perspective of 
business strategy (Collis and Montgomery, 1997), successful firms typically focus on how to 
establish their competitive advantages to ensure long-term asset growth and prosperity but not 
necessarily short-term profits. For example, higher-rated nursing homes may consider strategies 
such as attracting more residents and improving payer mix to better position these facilities 
against competition long term. 
Another nuanced finding of this study is the heterogeneous star rating effects depending on 
the star thresholds. Specifically, financial measures are more responsive at the 5-star threshold, 
compared to other thresholds. From the consumers’ perspective, this implies that consumers are 
more likely to differentiate top-ranked nursing homes from other facilities with lower star 
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ratings. The necessary condition for the report card to be effective is to ensure that consumers 
use the information. However, due to barriers such as time constraints, consumers may only be 
able to engage with the information that is presented in the report card to the extent that they take 
the 5-star as a sure sign of superior quality. Therefore, designers of the report card should 
consider how to better differentiate nursing homes with middle or lower star ratings. 
The lack of effect of star ratings on profit margins raises the question why nursing homes 
would be incentivized to obtain higher star ratings if this does not bring financial benefits. From 
the government’s perspective, this is an important issue. The success of report cards relies on the 
engagement from not only consumers but also providers. Typically, decisions on quality 
improvement are made by nursing homes. The majority of nursing homes are for-profit facilities 
and their priority is to gain profits. To my knowledge, currently there is no nationwide financial 
incentive that directly rewards nursing home performance. However, in fiscal year 2019, CMS 
will start a Value-Based Purchasing Program that rewards participating skilled nursing facilities 
with incentive payments based on their performance on the 30-day hospital readmission 
measure. The experience from that program will have important implications on whether the 
federal government should consider tying financial incentives to nursing homes’ performance in 
the report card. 
As is true for any empirical work, this study has several limitations. First, the RD design is 
known to have limited external validity even with its strong internal validity. In this study, the 
identification of the main effects, also known as the local average treatment effects, comes from 
the nursing homes with inspection scores that are close to the thresholds of star assignment. 
Accordingly, the financial effects of star ratings among nursing homes with underlying quality 
scores that are far away from the thresholds are not estimated. In addition, to better 
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accommodate the RD design and avoid plausible manipulation of the underlying scores in 
quality and staffing domains (Thomas, 2014), I limit the study sample to nursing homes with 
health inspection star ratings that equal their overall ratings. Even though the good comparability 
of the selected observable measures between these two groups of nursing homes alleviate the 
concerns about sample selection, the unobserved characteristics among these nursing homes still 
raise the issue of generalizability. Second, I obtain the health inspection and star rating data from 
CMS for the months of October during the study period. Although nursing homes’ ratings 
generally do not change unless new inspection data are available, it is still an empirical question 
to test whether the main results from this study are robust to the star rating data in other months. 
Third, the reliability and accuracy of the MCR data have been an issue for researchers and public 
stakeholders who are interested in using the data because the data are not routinely audited and 
subject to limited verification. Because Medicare does not reimburse nursing homes based on 
cost reports, nursing homes generally put limited efforts into ensuring the accuracy of the 
information in the reports. Although the data used in this study are carefully cleaned, issues such 
as reporting errors cannot be fully eliminated. Fourth, this study focuses on the financial effects 
of star ratings for nursing homes. Although the theoretical framework suggests several 
mechanisms through which star ratings could affect financial outcomes, I could only explore the 
roles of payer mix and occupancy rates due to the data limitations. Future studies that use similar 
empirical identification strategies should explore other important pathways such as the number 
of admissions and private prices. 
In conclusion, the main results of this study suggest that the new five-star quality rating 
system shows limited effects on nursing homes’ financial performance. Among all four 
thresholds that are used to assign the number of stars, only the 5-star threshold has significantly 
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positive and robust effects on both the revenues and costs of 5-star nursing homes. However, 
profit margins are not affected by any of the star rating levels. In the past few years, the trend of 
replacing detailed and fragmented quality measures with a simplified summary rating system has 
increased within the healthcare sector. Given that most of the rating systems are relatively new 
(e.g., the five-star rating system for hospitals that was initiated in 2016), both the direct and 
indirect effects of this type of star rating system remain a promising research area for future 
studies. 
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1.10 Figures 
Figure 1. 1 Example of Nursing Home Compare Five-Star Quality Report System (as of 
November 2017) 
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Figure 1. 2 Relationship between star ratings and health inspection scores 
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Figure 1. 3 RD plots - operating revenue per patient day 
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Notes: Each dot represents the sample average on operating revenue per patient day within each percentile based on health inspection scores. The vertical line 
represents the star threshold. The curve lines represent polynomial fit lines based on the data. All dollar amounts are CPI adjusted to 2014 dollars. 
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Figure 1. 4 RD plots - operating cost per patient day 
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Notes: Each dot represents the sample average on operating expense per patient day within each percentile based on health inspection scores. The vertical line 
represents the star threshold. The curve lines represent polynomial fit lines based on the data. All dollar amounts are CPI adjusted to 2014 dollars. 
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Figure 1. 5 RD plots - operating profit margin per patient day 
  
 
Notes: Each dot represents the sample average on operating profit margin per patient day within each percentile based on health inspection scores. The vertical 
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line represents the star threshold. The curve lines represent polynomial fit lines based on the data. All dollar amounts are CPI adjusted to 2014 dollars. 
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1.11 Tables 
Table 1. 1 Characteristics of nursing homes by overall stars 2008-2013 
Number of overall star 
ratings 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Operating revenue PPD 243.72 118.93 257.54 183.75 254.87 132.39 271.11 157.36 319.51 268.34 
Operating cost PPD 241.44 119.26 251.33 180.78 248.01 132.89 263.69 160.80 313.47 284.65 
Operating profit margin 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08 
Chain-owned 0.64 0.48 0.61 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.51 0.50 
For-profit 0.90 0.30 0.87 0.34 0.85 0.35 0.79 0.41 0.72 0.45 
Number of beds 127.06 56.95 120.59 58.43 113.65 54.56 105.21 56.08 96.26 60.79 
ADL index 16.08 2.75 16.33 2.75 16.31 2.75 16.40 2.66 16.62 2.80 
Average age 77.66 6.13 79.14 6.07 80.39 5.50 81.99 5.23 83.30 5.19 
% Female 66.13 11.11 67.97 11.26 69.87 10.77 72.00 10.15 73.76 10.25 
% White 78.58 21.57 79.86 21.88 82.84 21.18 86.22 19.43 87.82 18.91 
% Medicare 13.67 8.70 14.66 10.46 14.80 10.30 15.49 11.87 16.48 14.08 
% Medicaid 67.53 15.16 64.64 17.26 63.04 17.44 58.83 20.12 54.02 23.59 
Occupancy rate 80.72 14.18 83.11 13.33 83.64 13.57 84.73 12.95 86.55 12.27 
County HHI 1833.29 2188.61 1881.27 2320.84 2080.23 2449.42 2078.40 2450.00 1907.02 2288.27 
Observations 6595 4622 4349 6551 3550 
Notes: Nursing homes (1) located in AK, DC or HI or (2) owned by government or (3) hospital-based are excluded. All dollars are converted to 2014 dollar using the CPI 
index. 
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Table 1. 2 Characteristics of nursing homes close to star thresholds by overall stars 2008-2013 
 2-star threshold 3-star threshold 4-star threshold 5-star threshold 
Number of overall star ratings 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 
Chain-owned 0.62 0.63 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.57 0.54 0.51 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
For-profit 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.76 0.74 
 (0.31) (0.33) (0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.40) (0.41) (0.45) 
Number of beds 128.00 124.66 117.03 118.90 111.79 109.22 97.55 96.92 
 (63.45) (62.26) (54.95) (55.04) (58.93) (55.81) (54.34) (60.54) 
ADL index 16.27 16.24 16.42 16.37 16.38 16.43 16.38 16.60 
 (2.68) (2.69) (2.76) (2.70) (2.71) (2.57) (2.75) (2.94) 
Age 78.50 78.79 79.65 80.32 80.62 81.58 82.22 82.90 
 (5.68) (6.09) (5.88) (5.38) (5.56) (5.30) (5.20) (5.60) 
% Female 67.43 67.25 68.60 69.61 70.44 71.19 72.73 73.18 
 (10.41) (11.34) (11.18) (11.05) (10.53) (10.26) (10.36) (10.62) 
% White 79.50 78.48 80.50 81.91 83.81 85.52 86.82 87.56 
 (21.11) (22.51) (21.53) (21.65) (21.50) (19.89) (18.46) (18.90) 
Observations 1466 1107 861 945 845 1523 1265 2031 
Notes: Nursing homes (1) located in AK, DC or HI or (2) owned by government or (3) hospital-based are excluded. The sample represents nursing homes with health 
inspection scores within 5 percentile points around each threshold of the star ratings. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1. 3 Main RD results 
Threshold  
in year t 
Financial measures in year t+1  
Log operating revenue PPD Log operating cost PPD Operating profit margin PPD N 
5 stars 0.051** 0.044** 0.0070 3162 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.0059)  
     
4 stars -0.028 -0.031 0.0027 2368 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.0067)  
     
3 stars -0.0029 -0.00080 -0.0016 1806 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.0076)  
     
2 stars 0.034** 0.039** -0.0052 2573 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.0068)  
Notes: The sample is limited to nursing homes with health inspection scores within 5 percentile points around each star threshold. All estimates use local linear regression. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) owned by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or HI are excluded. Standard 
errors are clustered at the nursing home level. Constant terms, covariates, year dummies and state fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Covariates include profit status, 
chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic characteristics including age, gender and race. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 1. 4 Effects of star ratings on payer mix 
Threshold  
in year t 
Payer mix measures in year t+1  
% Medicare % Medicaid % Private-pay N 
5 stars -0.47 -1.02 1.49* 3162 
 (0.76) (1.15) (0.86)  
     
4 stars -0.89 1.08 -0.19 2368 
 (0.90) (1.41) (1.06)  
     
3 stars -0.04 -0.64 0.68 1806 
 (0.90) (1.36) (1.03)  
     
2 stars -0.69 -0.80 1.49* 2573 
 (0.69) (1.09) (0.86)  
Notes: The sample is limited to nursing homes with health inspection scores within 5 percentile points around each star threshold. All estimates use local linear regression. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) owned by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or HI are excluded. Standard 
errors are clustered at the nursing home level. Constant terms, covariates, year dummies and state fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Covariates include profit status, 
chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic characteristics including age, gender and race. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1. 5 Effects of star ratings on occupancy rate 
Threshold  
in year t 
Occupancy rate in year t+1 N 
5 stars 0.91 3162 
 (0.59)  
   
4 stars 2.73*** 2368 
 (0.97)  
   
3 stars -1.40 1806 
 (1.03)  
   
2 stars 0.41 2573 
 (0.93)  
Notes: The sample is limited to nursing homes with health inspection scores within 5 percentile points around each star threshold. All estimates use local linear regression. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) owned by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or HI are excluded. Standard 
errors are clustered at the nursing home level. Constant terms, covariates, year dummies and state fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Covariates include profit status, 
chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic characteristics including age, gender and race. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1. 6 Heterogeneous RD estimates varied by market competition 
Threshold  
in year t 
Financial measures in year t+1  
Log operating revenue PPD Log operating cost PPD Operating profit margin PPD N 
 More competitive market (HHI ≤ 2500)  
5 stars 0.072** 0.063** 0.0095 2297 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.0071)  
     
4 stars -0.031 -0.041 0.0098 1687 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.0080)  
     
3 stars -0.023 -0.019 -0.0029 1306 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.0090)  
     
2 stars 0.033* 0.040** -0.0061 1942 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.0079)  
     
 Less competitive market (HHI > 2500)  
5 stars -0.015 -0.012 -0.0034 865 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.010)  
     
4 stars -0.052* -0.041 -0.011 681 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.013)  
     
3 stars 0.052* 0.049 0.0036 500 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.015)  
     
2 stars 0.024 0.032 -0.0082 631 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.014)  
Notes: The sample is limited to nursing homes with health inspection scores within 5 percentile points around each star threshold. All estimates use local linear regression. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) owned by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or HI are excluded. Standard 
errors are clustered at the nursing home level. Constant terms, covariates, year dummies and state fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Covariates include profit status, 
chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic characteristics including age, gender and race. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
57 
 
Table 1. 7 RD estimates on nursing homes without changes in overall ratings 
Threshold  
in year t 
Financial measures in year t+1  
Log operating revenue PPD Log operating cost PPD Operating profit margin PPD N 
5 stars 0.097*** 0.094*** 0.0031 1762 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.0093)  
     
4 stars 0.040 0.047 -0.0074 993 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.011)  
     
3 stars 0.019 0.024 -0.0042 608 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.014)  
     
2 stars 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.0020 1119 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.010)  
Notes: The sample is limited to nursing homes with health inspection scores within 5 percentile points around each star threshold. In addition, these nursing homes did not 
experience changes in their overall ratings within a calendar year. All estimates use local linear regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) 
owned by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or HI are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing home level. Constant terms, covariates, 
year dummies and state fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Covariates include profit status, chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic 
characteristics including age, gender and race. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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1.12 Appendix 
Figure A 1. McCrary density tests 
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Notes: These figures are based on the McCrary (2008) tests for discontinuity in density at each of the star threshold. In general, these tests look for evidence of 
manipulation of star assignment around each threshold. More specifically, each figure is the scatterplot of nursing homes’ percentile ranking based on their health inspection scores 
around the star thresholds. The solid line is a local polynomial smoother fitting the distribution. In addition, the 95% confidence intervals of the estimators are shown above and 
below the solid line. 
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Figure A 2. RD plots - operating revenue per patient day (based on simulated stars in 2007) 
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Notes: Each dot represents the sample average on operating revenue per patient day within each percentile based on health inspection scores. The vertical line represents 
the star threshold. All dollar amounts are CPI adjusted to 2014 dollars. 
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Figure A 3. RD plots - operating cost per patient day (based on simulated stars in 2007) 
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 Notes: Each dot represents the sample average on operating expense per patient day within each percentile based on health inspection scores. The vertical line represents 
the star threshold. All dollar amounts are CPI adjusted to 2014 dollars. 
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Figure A 4. RD plots - operating profit margin per patient day (based on simulated stars in 2007) 
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Notes: Each dot represents the sample average on operating profit margin per patient day within each percentile based on health inspection scores. The vertical line 
represents the star threshold. All dollar amounts are CPI adjusted to 2014 dollars.
 66 
Table A 1. Characteristics of nursing homes 2008-2013 
 Full Sample 
(all nursing homes) 
Preferred Sample  
(health inspection star = overall star) 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Health inspection rating 2.73 1.26 2.84 1.41 
Operating revenue PPD 268.93 180.17 265.57 171.82 
Operating cost PPD 263.31 183.20 259.97 175.67 
Operating profit margin 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 
% Medicare 14.98 11.33 14.89 11.02 
% Medicaid 61.96 19.66 62.16 19.11 
Occupancy rate 83.28 13.59 83.47 13.50 
Chain-owned 0.59 0.49 0.59 0.49 
For-profit 0.83 0.38 0.83 0.37 
Number of beds 112.92 57.82 113.79 58.14 
ADL index 16.31 2.78 16.32 2.74 
Average age 80.23 6.15 80.28 6.01 
% Female 69.39 11.28 69.65 11.07 
% White 82.28 21.33 82.76 20.98 
County HHI 1928.62 2330.96 1956.53 2341.86 
Observations 49971 25667 
Nursing homes (1) located in AK, DC or HI or (2) owned by government or (3) hospital-based are excluded. Standard 
deviations are reported in parentheses. 
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Table A 2. RD results with alternative bandwidth selections – 5-star threshold 
Alternative 
bandwidths  
in year t 
Financial measures in year t+1  
Log operating 
revenue PPD 
Log operating cost 
PPD 
Operating profit 
margin 
N 
2.5 0.059* 0.062* -0.0025 1537 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.0092)  
3 0.058** 0.057** 0.0017 1830 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.0078)  
3.5 0.066** 0.060** 0.0063 2173 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.0069)  
4 0.055** 0.046* 0.0094 2503 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.0065)  
4.5 0.057** 0.049** 0.0088 2786 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.0062)  
5 0.051** 0.044** 0.0070 3162 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.0059)  
5.5 0.056*** 0.051** 0.0056 3450 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.0056)  
6 0.051** 0.045** 0.0064 3825 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.0053)  
6.5 0.054*** 0.048** 0.0069 4111 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.0051)  
7 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.0052 4424 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.0049)  
7.5 0.056*** 0.050*** 0.0056 4766 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.0047)  
Notes: All estimates use local linear regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) 
owned by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or HI are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the 
nursing home level. Constant terms, covariates, year dummies and state fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Covariates 
include profit status, chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic characteristics including age, gender and 
race. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A 3 RD results with alternative bandwidth selections – 4-star threshold 
Alternative 
bandwidths  
in year t 
Financial measures in year t+1  
Log operating 
revenue PPD 
Log operating cost 
PPD 
Operating profit 
margin 
N 
2.5 -0.039 -0.033 -0.0076 1150 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.010)  
3 -0.019 -0.0095 -0.011 1393 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.0085)  
3.5 -0.024 -0.017 -0.0068 1655 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.0078)  
4 -0.026 -0.025 -0.0016 1887 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.0074)  
4.5 -0.027 -0.025 -0.0018 2152 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.0070)  
5 -0.028 -0.031 0.0027 2368 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.0067)  
5.5 -0.017 -0.024 0.0071 2633 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.0063)  
6 -0.019 -0.025 0.0056 2856 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.0061)  
6.5 -0.020 -0.026 0.0059 3103 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.0058)  
7 -0.025 -0.030 0.0048 3341 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.0057)  
7.5 -0.015 -0.021 0.0058 3561 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.0055)  
Notes: All estimates use local linear regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) 
owned by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or HI are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the 
nursing home level. Constant terms, covariates, year dummies and state fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Covariates 
include profit status, chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic characteristics including age, gender and 
race. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 69 
Table A 4. RD results with alternative bandwidth selections – 3-star threshold 
Alternative 
bandwidths  
in year t 
Financial measures in year t+1  
Log operating 
revenue 
Log operating 
cost 
Operating profit 
margin 
N 
2.5 -0.0045 0.0058 -0.0096 907 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.010)  
3 0.022 0.024 -0.00096 1092 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.0095)  
3.5 0.015 0.022 -0.0067 1258 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.0089)  
4 0.015 0.021 -0.0055 1457 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.0084)  
4.5 -0.0013 0.0054 -0.0062 1625 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.0079)  
5 -0.0029 -0.00080 -0.0016 1806 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.0076)  
5.5 -0.0071 -0.0043 -0.0023 1991 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.0072)  
6 -0.0051 -0.00053 -0.0039 2187 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.0069)  
6.5 -0.00073 0.0026 -0.0027 2363 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.0066)  
7 -0.00037 0.0032 -0.0030 2577 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.0063)  
7.5 -0.0030 -0.00074 -0.0016 2797 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.0062)  
Notes: All estimates use local linear regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) 
owned by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or HI are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the 
nursing home level. Constant terms, covariates, year dummies and state fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Covariates 
include profit status, chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic characteristics including age, gender and 
race. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A 5. RD results with alternative bandwidth selections – 2-star threshold 
Alternative 
bandwidths  
in year t 
Financial measures in year t+1  
Log operating 
revenue 
Log operating 
cost 
Operating profit 
margin 
N 
2.5 0.015 0.015 0.000082 1255 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.010)  
3 0.017 0.021 -0.0034 1512 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.0092)  
3.5 0.011 0.018 -0.0077 1782 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.0084)  
4 0.022 0.030* -0.0084 2038 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.0077)  
4.5 0.028* 0.032* -0.0045 2323 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.0072)  
5 0.034** 0.039** -0.0052 2573 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.0068)  
5.5 0.033** 0.040** -0.0066 2844 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.0065)  
6 0.031** 0.038** -0.0065 3097 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.0062)  
6.5 0.027* 0.034** -0.0066 3392 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.0059)  
7 0.027* 0.031** -0.0037 3652 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.0057)  
7.5 0.028** 0.032** -0.0034 3940 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.0055)  
Notes: All estimates use local linear regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) 
owned by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or HI are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the 
nursing home level. Constant terms, covariates, year dummies and state fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Covariates 
include profit status, chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic characteristics including age, gender and 
race. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A 6. Main RD results with MSE-optimal bandwidth selection 
Threshold  
in year t 
Financial measures in year t+1 
MSE-optimal 
bandwidth 
N Log operating 
revenue PPD 
Log operating 
cost PPD 
Operating profit 
margin PPD 
5 stars 0.052** 0.045** 0.0068 4.938 3136 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.0059)   
      
4 stars -0.022 -0.029 0.0068 6.299 3011 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.0059)   
      
3 stars -0.0068 -0.0047 -0.0016 5.278 1903 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.0073)   
      
2 stars 0.035** 0.041** -0.0064 5.614 2899 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.0064)   
Notes: The sample is limited to nursing homes with health inspection scores within the MSE-optimal bandwidth around 
each star threshold. All estimates use local linear regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are 
(1) owned by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or HI are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at 
the nursing home level. Constant terms, covariates, year dummies and state fixed effects are estimated but not reported. 
Covariates include profit status, chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic characteristics including age, 
gender and race. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A 7 Comparison of RD estimates between different functional forms (5-star threshold) 
Functional 
forms 
(1) (2) (3)  
 Log operating revenue 
PPD 
Log operating cost 
PPD 
Operating profit 
margin 
N 
No covariates 0.057** 0.050** 0.0074 3296 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.0061)  
Linear 0.051** 0.044** 0.0070 3162 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.0059)  
Quadratic 0.065** 0.061* 0.0054 3162 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.0093)  
Cubic 0.063** 0.055* 0.0082 3162 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.0069)  
Notes: All estimates use a bandwidth of 5 percentile points around the score threshold of each star. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) owned by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or 
HI are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing home level. Constant terms, year dummies and state fixed effects are 
estimated but not reported. Covariates include profit status, chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic 
characteristics including age, gender and race. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A 8 Comparison of RD estimates between different functional forms (4-star threshold) 
Functional 
forms 
(1) (2) (3)  
 Log operating revenue 
PPD 
Log operating cost 
PPD 
Operating profit 
margin 
N 
No covariates -0.029 -0.030 0.0010 2450 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.0067)  
Linear -0.028 -0.031 0.0027 2368 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.0067)  
Quadratic -0.034 -0.016 -0.019* 2368 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.0098)  
Cubic -0.033 -0.034 -0.00043 2368 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.0075)  
Notes: All estimates use a bandwidth of 5 percentile points around the score threshold of each star. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) owned by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or 
HI are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing home level. Constant terms, year dummies and state fixed effects are 
estimated but not reported. Covariates include profit status, chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic 
characteristics including age, gender and race. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A 9 Comparison of RD estimates between different functional forms (3-star threshold) 
Functional 
forms 
(1) (2) (3)  
 Log operating revenue 
PPD 
Log operating cost 
PPD 
Operating profit 
margin 
N 
No covariates 0.0081 0.0083 0.00020 1870 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.0077)  
Linear -0.0029 -0.00080 -0.0016 1806 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.0076)  
Quadratic 0.024 0.033 -0.0089 1806 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.011)  
Cubic 0.022 0.026 -0.0028 1806 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.0089)  
Notes: All estimates use a bandwidth of 5 percentile points around the score threshold of each star. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) owned by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or 
HI are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing home level. Constant terms, year dummies and state fixed effects are 
estimated but not reported. Covariates include profit status, chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic 
characteristics including age, gender and race. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A 10. Comparison of RD estimates between different functional forms (2-star 
threshold) 
Functional 
forms 
(1) (2) (3)  
 Log operating revenue 
PPD 
Log operating cost 
PPD 
Operating profit 
margin 
N 
No covariates 0.031* 0.034** -0.0031 2664 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.0069)  
Linear 0.034** 0.039** -0.0052 2573 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.0068)  
Quadratic 0.033** 0.038** -0.0051 2573 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.0068)  
Cubic 0.012 0.011 0.0019 2573 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.015)  
Notes: All estimates use a bandwidth of 5 percentile points around the score threshold of each star. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) owned by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or 
HI are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing home level. Constant terms, year dummies and state fixed effects are 
estimated but not reported. Covariates include profit status, chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic 
characteristics including age, gender and race. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A 11. RD estimates on baseline covariates 
Threshold  
in year t 
Baseline covariates in year t+1 
Bed 
size 
For-
profit 
Chain-
owned 
ADL 
index 
Age % 
Female 
% 
White 
N 
5 stars 5.68 -0.025 0.013 -0.19 -0.37 -1.05 -0.17 3162 
 (3.88) (0.030) (0.036) (0.17) (0.36) (0.72) (1.29)  
         
4 stars -3.92 -0.0028 0.0062 0.058 0.90* 1.25 2.26 2368 
 (4.95) (0.032) (0.042) (0.19) (0.47) (0.91) (1.65)  
         
3 stars 7.18 0.0032 -0.020 0.082 0.13 0.24 -1.19 1806 
 (4.75) (0.031) (0.044) (0.21) (0.53) (1.07) (1.87)  
         
2 stars 1.12 -0.015 0.043 -0.29 -0.060 -0.23 0.033 2573 
 (4.51) (0.024) (0.036) (0.18) (0.44) (0.86) (1.61)  
Notes: The sample is limited to nursing homes with health inspection scores within 5 percentile points around each star 
threshold. All estimates use local linear regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) owned 
by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or HI are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing 
home level. Constant terms, year dummies and state fixed effects are estimated but not reported. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
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Table A 12. Main RD results using 2007 simulated ratings 
Threshold  
in 2007 
Financial measures in 2008  
Log operating revenue Log operating cost Operating profit margin N 
5 stars -0.011 0.015 -0.026** 647 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.012)  
     
4 stars -0.034 -0.037 0.0033 794 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.012)  
     
3 stars 0.034 0.036 -0.0026 867 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.011)  
     
2 stars 0.045 0.038 0.0083 875 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.011)  
Notes: The sample is limited to nursing homes with health inspection scores within 5 percentile points around each star 
threshold. All estimates use local linear regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nursing homes that are (1) owned 
by government or (2) hospital-affiliated or (3) located in AK, DC or HI are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing 
home level. Constant terms, covariates, year dummies and state fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Covariates include 
profit status, chain affiliation, bed size, ADL index and residents' demographic characteristics including age, gender and race. * p 
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Chapter 2 The effects of chain acquisitions on practice patterns: Evidence 
from the nursing home industry 
2.1 Introduction 
Medicare covers post-acute care such as skilled nursing care and therapy services for 
qualifying beneficiaries admitted to nursing homes. As of 2015, about 1.7 million Medicare fee-
for-service beneficiaries received skilled nursing services and Medicare paid approximately 
$29.8 billion for these services (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2017). Currently, the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) uses a Prospective Payment System (PPS) 
to pay for Medicare-eligible skilled nursing services. By design, the Medicare PPS for nursing 
homes rewards high intensity care. 
In particular, it is well documented that nursing homes have been exploiting this 
reimbursement method by putting more residents into the more profitable reimbursement 
categories, even though patient characteristics did not change much. For example, from 2010 to 
2015, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services published a series of reports (OIG, 2010; OIG, 2012; OIG, 2015) documenting the 
increasingly aggressive billing practice patterns by nursing homes during the 2000s. In August 
2015, the Wall Street Journal (Weaver et al., 2015) published a story describing how the 
Medicare PPS incentivizes nursing homes to pursue excessive amounts of therapies for residents 
to get higher payment rates. Shortly after that, another report published in the New York Times 
(Pear, 2015) also focused on the issue of nursing homes billing for more therapy than patients 
need, citing findings from the aforementioned OIG reports. “The current payment system created 
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an incentive for nursing homes to provide as much therapy to a resident as that resident can 
tolerate” said a CMS official (Pear, 2015). 
Anecdotal speculations such as media reports or lawsuits suggest that large for-profit 
nursing home chains might systematically game the system (Weaver et al., 2015; Pear, 2015; 
Department of Justice, 2016a; Department of Justice, 2016b). In the past two decades, chains, 
defined as owning two or more facilities, have played an increasingly important role in shaping 
the nursing home industry, similar to their increasing presence in other industries within the 
healthcare sector (Cuellar and Gertler, 2005; Pozniak et al., 2010; Stevenson et al., 2015; Huang 
and Kim, 2017). Focusing on nursing homes, a recent study (Grabowski et al., 2016) 
documented tremendous chain-related ownership changes that occurred in the past two decades. 
Because more than 50% of the nursing homes in the United States are owned by chains, the 
potential impacts of chains on quality of care (Harrington et al., 2001; Banaszak-Holl et al., 
2002), nurse staffing (Harrington et al., 2012) and nursing homes’ financial health (Weech-
Maldonado et al., 2012; Cadigan et al., 2015) have been concerns for policymakers and 
researchers alike. 
However, empirical evidence on whether chain affiliation affects the practice patterns of 
nursing homes have been relatively sparse. This study aims to fill this gap in the  literature. More 
specifically, I use national nursing home data from 2003 to 2009 to compare relevant practice 
patterns between independent nursing homes and their chain-acquired counterparts. Furthermore, 
I explore the possible heterogeneous effects depending on profit status and chain size of the 
acquiring chains. 
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2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Nursing homes in the United States 
In the United States, there are about 15,600 nursing homes serving roughly 1.4 million 
elderly on any given day (National Center for Health Statistics, 2015). Expenditures on nursing 
facilities across the country were about $160 billion in 2014 and projected to reach $270 billion 
in 2023 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014). Medicare and Medicaid together 
pay nearly 80% of the total nursing home costs, while out-of-pocket payments account for the 
rest (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013). Typically, Medicaid – the largest payer for nursing home 
services – pays for long-term stays, while Medicare – the more generous payer compared to 
Medicaid – pays for services related to short-term stays such as post-acute care. The nursing 
home industry is mixed in terms of profit status and chain membership of the facilities. Based on 
the data used in this study, about two thirds of the nursing homes are for-profit facilities. 
Corporate chains have become an important organization form in the nursing home industry. The 
proportion of chain-affiliated nursing homes grew steadily from less than 40% in early 1990s to 
over 50% in early 2000s (Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002). Since then, chain-owned nursing homes 
consistently account for more than 50% of the nursing homes in the United States each year 
(Grabowski et al., 2016). The quality of care in nursing homes has been characterized as being 
low for a long time (Institute of Medicine, 1986). In addition, the public image of nursing home 
industry is jeopardized by issues such as financial fraud (Department of Justice, 2016a; 
Department of Justice, 2016b), high staffing turnover rate (Castle and Engberg, 2005) and 
increasingly complex corporation structure (Stevenson et al., 2013; Harrington et al., 2015). 
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2.2.2 Medicare PPS       
Medicare Part A covers post-acute short-term stays for elderly patients in the nursing 
homes for up to 100 days. The covered services include skilled nursing care, rehabilitation and 
other services. To be eligible for Medicare Part A benefits, the beneficiary must be admitted to a 
nursing home within one month following a qualifying hospital stay and must require skilled 
nursing services related to her/his hospital stay on a daily basis. The qualifying beneficiary does 
not have out-of-pocket payment for the first 20 days of the stay. Then, from days 21 up to 100, 
the copayment is about $164.50 per day (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2017). 
Prior to 1998, Medicare used a cost-based reimbursement method for eligible nursing 
homes services. Under that scheme, providers were reimbursed based on actual costs of care and 
thus had little incentive to control costs or improve efficiency. For example, ancillary services 
such as physical and occupational therapies were subject to little review of use by CMS, then 
known as the Health Care Financing Administration. Between 1989 and 1996, the number of 
Medicare beneficiaries in nursing homes almost doubled from 636,000 to 1.1 million. The 
average Medicare nursing home payment per day increased drastically from $98 in 1990 to $292 
in 1996. The rapid growth of Medicare expenditure for skilled nursing care eventually led to the 
major payment reform in July 1998. 
In 1998, Medicare changed its reimbursement for nursing home services from a cost-based 
approach to the PPS with the main objective being to incentivize providers to improve their 
operational efficiency. Specifically, instead of paying for nursing home services based on actual 
costs, the Medicare PPS pays a fixed amount for each day of nursing home service adjusting for 
case mix and types of services using the Resource Utilization Group (RUG) system, regardless 
actual expenses incurred. Upon admission to nursing homes, residents are classified into a 
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variety RUGs based on their care and resource needs during a seven-day assessment period. This 
classification method is used to determine how much Medicare pays the nursing homes each day. 
As of 2009, there were 53 RUGs within eight categories including both therapy and non-
therapy RUGs. Therapy RUGs are for residents who need physical, speech or occupational 
therapies while non-therapy RUGs are for beneficiaries who need skilled nursing care other than 
therapy services. Based on the number of therapy minutes incurred and the degree of functional 
limitations of the patient, therapy RUGs are categorized into five levels: ultra high, very high, 
high, medium and low. In general, the greater the minutes of therapy, the higher level of therapy 
RUG is assigned.  
Each year, CMS updates the base payment rates using a market-basket index to reflect 
fluctuation in prices of goods and services. Typically, Medicare payment rates for therapy RUGs 
are higher than for non-therapy RUGs. Moreover, the reimbursement rate increases with the 
assigned level of RUGs from low through ultra high. Table 2.1 shows the average Medicare 
payment rates, costs, average profits, and marginal profits of the therapy-component by level of 
therapy for nursing homes in 2012. For example, according to the OIG report published in 2015 
(OIG, 2015), the average payment of the therapy-component associated with ultra high RUGs 
was $231 in FY2012 while the average rates of the therapy-component for medium or low 
therapy RUGs were only $67 and $37, respectively. Because the average marginal profits 
monotonically increase when categorizing a patient from a lower level to a higher level of 
therapy category, the Medicare PPS for nursing homes creates a strong financial incentive to 
more aggressively bill for higher therapy levels. 
To some extent, the Medicare PPS for nursing home services is not a true prospective 
system. First, unlike the diagnosis-related group system in the hospital industry or the episode-
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based system for home health services, Medicare PPS pays nursing homes on a daily basis. 
Second, the payment rate largely depends on the minutes of therapy provided to the resident over 
a seven-day look-back period. Although CMS implemented several measures to prevent fraud, 
reduce waste and monitor payment accuracy, clear clinical guidelines in determining the 
appropriate therapy minutes and treatment intensity for residents are still lacking. As a result, 
nursing homes have some control of both the intensity level of the therapy and length of stay — 
both of which determine the amount of Medicare payment nursing homes will receive for 
providing these services. 
2.3 Prior studies 
A majority of the relevant studies focused on the evaluation of the Medicare PPS by 
comparing nursing home performance before and after the policy changes. Using a study sample 
of residents admitted to nursing homes in Michigan and Ohio in 1998 and 1999, Wodchis (2004) 
found the introduction of Medicare PPS in 1998 was associated with increased likelihood for 
patients being assigned to the most profitable RUGs. Furthermore, Wodchis et al. (2004) 
concluded that Medicare PPS for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) reduced the relative risk of 
discharge to home and to death for Medicare residents, compared to non-Medicare residents. 
White (2005) found that nurse staffing levels dropped significantly after the PPS implementation 
and the effect was stronger among for-profit nursing homes. He did not find a significant 
association between PPS and quality of care. Grabowski et al. (2011) found that Medicare PPS 
led to a significant increase in both rehabilitative services and therapy minutes but no change in 
length of stay. Bowblis and Brunt (2014) suggested that nursing homes upcoded residents by 
putting a greater proportion of the patients into the RUGs with higher reimbursement rates 
through providing additional therapy minutes. In a more recent work, Bowblis et al. (2016) 
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found that not-for-profit nursing homes are less likely to engage in upcoding behaviors than their 
for-profit counterparts. Furthermore, they found the difference varies depending on the for-
profits’ market share. Jung et al. (2016) found that more therapy hours in nursing homes after the 
PPS appeared to improve outcomes, except for patients with the greatest need. Examining the 
similar up-coding issue in the home health industry, Kim and Norton (2015) found that entrants 
in the home health market were more likely to adopt strategic practice patterns to maximize their 
profits than were incumbents. Kim and Norton (2017) also found that for-profit home health 
agencies were more likely to adopt strategic practice patterns than were not-for-profits. Huang 
and Kim (2017) found chain-owned home health agencies, especially for-profit chains, are more 
likely to target a specific number of therapy visits to maximize their profits, compared to 
independent agencies. In the hospital setting, Koch et al. (2017) found that physicians who were 
acquired by health systems were more likely to deliver care in their acquiring system’s hospitals.  
2.4 Theoretical framework 
2.4.1 Profit status 
Nursing home industry is a mixed-ownership industry including both for-profit and not-
for-profit nursing homes (Hirth, 1999; Norton, 2000; Grabowski and Hirth, 2003). Economic 
theories suggest that for-profit nursing homes maximize their profits by setting price, quality and 
quantity of services at an optimal level where their marginal revenues equal marginal costs 
(Norton, 2000; Sloan, 2000). Driven by their organizational objectives, for-profit nursing homes 
distribute their profits to shareholders. Unlike their for-profit counterparts, not-for-profit nursing 
homes do not necessarily pursue the goal of profit maximization. They are not allowed to 
distribute their profits to shareholders. In addition, not-for-profit nursing homes typically enjoy 
several tax-related benefits such as exemption from corporate income and property taxes. In 
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return, not-for-profits must serve a public good. Therefore, not-for-profit nursing homes may use 
generated profits to reinvest into areas such as facility renovation and quality improvement. 
Because not-for-profit nursing homes do not serve for shareholders’ interests, they may have 
greater incentives to improve quality (Hansmann, 1980; Hirth, 1999; Sloan, 2000). In the context 
of financial incentives of putting more residents into more profitable RUGs, not-for-profits might 
focus more on providing optimal and appropriate care than for-profits. On the other hand, for-
profits could be more incentivized to provide more unnecessary but lucrative services.   
2.4.2 Chain affiliation 
Because a majority of nursing home chains are for-profit organizations, profit 
maximization is their top priority. With pressure from their stakeholders (Kitchener et al., 2008), 
chains might face stronger incentives to seek and exploit aggressive billing behaviors than 
independent nursing homes. Theoretically, corporate owners could use standardization as a 
universal process to streamline administrative and clinical processes across facilities within the 
chains (Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002; Kamimura et al., 2007). Such standardization strategy could 
reduce managerial costs and ease resource dependencies. For example, standardization within 
nursing home chains could be implemented in areas such as service provision and staffing levels 
and mix. Typically, operational targets of many chain-owned nursing homes are set at the 
corporate level. Therefore, chaining would facilitate knowledge learning and sharing between 
facilities. In addition, chain size could also play an important role. Compared to smaller chains or 
independent nursing homes, large chains have more resources, capacity and economic of scales 
in achieving information sharing, standardization and knowledge transferring (Banaszak-Holl et 
al., 2002; Pozniak et al., 2010).  
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From the strategic perspective, it is possible for chains to form a culture to pursue profits 
by systematically exploiting more lucrative therapy reimbursement codes. Indeed, in some high-
profile Medicare fraud lawsuit cases, the Department of Justice alleged the nursing home chains 
that they “had a corporate strategy to maximize the daily minutes and the number of days it 
billed to Medicare at the ‘ultra high level’ of therapy” (Department of Justice, 2016a), and that 
they “created a corporate culture that improperly incentivized therapists and others to increase 
the amount of therapy provided to patients to meet planned targets for Medicare revenue” 
(Department of Justice, 2013). 
Nursing homes can provide therapy services through (1) their own staff therapists or (2) 
outsourcing to special therapy services companies. Compared to independent facilities, chains 
are more likely to have in-house therapists or to have bigger leveraging power if they hire 
therapy companies or to even own therapy services companies. Having more control in the 
provision of therapy services by having their own therapy service operations, chains could put 
pressure on therapists to maximize their therapy services billings. 
The plausible mechanisms stated above suggest chain-owned nursing homes are more 
likely to have a systematic scheme to strategically exploit Medicare reimbursement on therapy 
services. However, the relationship between chain affiliation and aggressive billing behaviors 
could be more complicated than suggested. For example, chains need to consider the risks of 
strict regulatory monitoring, media and public scrutiny, as well as possible litigation or loss of 
certifications from government payment programs. Furthermore, nursing home chains generally 
do not have a good reputation because of extensive negative reports. They might not want to 
further damage their reputations by gaming the payment system. In addition, providing highly 
intensive therapy services requires a certain number of therapists. Putting pressure on therapists 
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to provide additional and unnecessary therapy services to meet the thresholds of RUG codes with 
higher reimbursement rates could (1) jeopardize the relationship between therapists and nursing 
homes and (2) put the therapist’s license at risk. Given the fact that nursing home chains do not 
have a very good reputation in general, chains could be more cautious in exploiting the Medicare 
reimbursement scheme. 
Therefore, although some theoretical arguments suggest chain-owned nursing homes are 
more likely to be involved in aggressive billing behaviors, a few caveats might limit the extent to 
which chains would exploit the Medicare reimbursement scheme. 
2.5 Hypotheses 
To sum up, the Medicare PPS creates financial incentives for nursing homes at two 
dimensions. In terms of the reimbursement scheme, both the Medicare per diem’s average and 
marginal profits are considerably higher for high-intensity therapy RUGs than for lower-intensity 
RUGs. The lack of clarity in explaining clinical guidelines for therapy minutes creates financial 
incentives for nursing homes to pursue a more aggressive billing strategy by putting more 
residents into the more profitable RUGs. 
In terms of a nursing home stay, because Medicare PPS reimburses skilled nursing services 
at a per diem rate, not based upon an episode or a stay, it creates another incentive for nursing 
homes to increase the length of stay for Medicare beneficiaries. However, this incentive faces at 
least two challenges. First, if nursing homes provide residents with more intensive therapy 
services per week, the length of stay could be shortened due to the increase in treatment 
intensity, assuming these services are effective. Second, the copayment for Medicare 
beneficiaries starts to kick in after the first 20 days of stay. Therefore, nursing home residents 
would bear additional financial burden if their lengths of stay increase. In addition, from a 
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broader perspective, another incentive for nursing homes to keep the length of stay short is the 
recent initiatives such as pay-for-performance (Ryan et al., 2015) and Hospital Value-based 
Purchasing Program (Norton et al., 2018), which encourage the care coordination between 
hospitals and post-acute care providers. 
The differences in organizational form and objective could lead to heterogeneous 
responses between independent and chain-owned nursing homes. Although chains have strong 
incentives to strategically exploit Medicare reimbursement scheme on therapy RUGs, they also 
face risks such as stricter public scrutiny or damages to their reputations, which might limit the 
extent to which strategic billing practices could be implemented. 
In this study, I examine the practice patterns by focusing on both the change in distribution 
of RUG Medicare days (e.g., % ultra high RUG days, % very high RUG days, etc.) and the 
overall therapy-related profits within a nursing home over time. This way, I can explore any 
shifts among RUG distribution or changes in profits due to a change in chain ownership. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses related to practice patterns are proposed. 
Hypothesis 1. With a few caveats, chain-owned nursing homes are more likely to put more 
residents into RUGs with higher reimbursement rates, and to generate higher profits. 
Hypothesis 2. Any effect of chain ownership on strategic practice patterns is stronger in 
for-profit chains than in not-for-profit chains. 
Hypothesis 3. Any effect of chain ownership on strategic practice patterns is stronger in 
larger chains than in smaller chains. 
Hypothesis 4. The chain effect on length of stay for Medicare beneficiaries in nursing 
homes is ambiguous.  
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2.6 Empirical strategy 
2.6.1 General model 
To compare changes in practice patterns between chain-owned and independent nursing 
homes, I track each nursing home over time and take advantage of changes in chain ownership 
(e.g., chain acquisition of independent nursing homes) within each facility due to acquisitions. 
More specifically, to explore the effects of chain acquisition of independent nursing homes on 
their practice patterns (Hypotheses 1 and 4), I estimate a Difference-in-Differences (DID) model 
in which the pre-post changes in practice patterns for independent nursing homes that were 
acquired by chains and the pre-post changes in practice patterns for independent nursing homes 
that did not experience acquisition are compared. More specifically, in this event study setting, I 
estimate regression models including a chain acquisition indicator, a vector of time-varying 
nursing home structural characteristics, the nursing home fixed effects and year dummies. The 
model specification is described below:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the measure for practice patterns (either the change in proportion of different types 
of RUG days and overall therapy related profits for Hypothesis 1 or the change in Medicare 
length of stay for Hypothesis 4) of nursing home 𝑖 at year 𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of time-varying nursing 
home characteristics, 𝜃𝑖 is the nursing home fixed effect, 𝜆𝑡 are a series of year dummies, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
is the random error term for nursing home 𝑖 at year 𝑡. The main explanatory variable 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 is 
an indicator of post chain acquisition for nursing home 𝑖 at year 𝑡. To test Hypotheses 1 and 4, 𝛽1 
is the coefficient of interest, measuring the average changes in practice patterns associated with 
chain acquisitions. Because each nursing home has multiple observations across the study period, 
standard errors are clustered at the facility level and adjusted for heteroskadasticity. 
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When examining the effect of chain acquisitions on changes in the distribution of different 
types of RUG days, the dependent variables are the proportions of Medicare days billed at 
different RUG categories, respectively. Specifically, they include proportions of ultra high, very 
high, high, medium, and non-therapy RUG days. Each of them is fit using the ordinary least 
squares. I do not examine low RUG days in this study because this type is rare, only accounting 
for less than 1% of total Medicare days. 
In addition, to examine the change in overall therapy-related profitability due to chain 
affiliation, I construct a single composite index of therapy profitability to measure the overall 
profit per resident day of the therapy-component for each nursing home. More specifically, using 
the profit information presented in Table 2.1, the overall therapy-component profit is a weighted 
average measure taking account of the profit per resident day and the proportion of Medicare 
days associated with each type of therapy RUGs. The formula is shown below: 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑖
= ∑(𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑗  
5
𝑗=1
× 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑗) 
where j indexes each of the five RUG categories ranging from ultra high to low RUGs for 
nursing home i in a given year.  
To control for other factors that might affect the practice patterns for nursing homes, I 
include a set of time-varying vector of nursing home characteristics, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, containing profit status, 
number of beds, occupancy rate, payer mix, demographic characteristics and activities of daily 
living (ADL) index; a set of staffing measures including Registered Nurse (RN) hours per 
resident day, Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) hours per resident day, Certified Nurse Aide 
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(CNA) hours per resident day, Physical Therapist hours per resident day and Occupational 
Therapist hours per resident day. In addition, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on 
the number of beds of each nursing home is included to control for market competition within 
each county. Suggested by Hirth et al. (2017), the HHI is adjusted for common ownership for 
nursing homes within a county. 
To test Hypothesis 2 on the heterogeneities by profit status of acquiring chains, I use the 
same identification strategy stated above by separating acquisitions by for-profit chains and not-
for-profit chains. In addition, both for-profit acquisitions and not-for-profit acquisitions might 
increase intensity of therapy services but on different margins. For example, for-profit 
acquisitions may have stronger effects on the movement between very high RUGs and ultra high 
RUGs, while the not-for-profit acquisitions may be associated more with high RUGs to very 
high RUGs. To account for this possibility and to explicitly test the differences between these 
two types of acquisitions, I also use the overall therapy profitability index described above. 
More specifically, model specification (2) is used to test Hypothesis 2. 𝐹𝑃 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 is an 
indicator of post acquisition by for-profit chains for nursing home 𝑖 at year 𝑡, while 𝑁𝐹𝑃 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
is the indicator of post acquisition by not-for-profit chains for nursing home 𝑖 at year 𝑡. The 
control group contains independent nursing homes remaining independent throughout the study 
period. Accordingly, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 are the coefficients of interest, respectively. I expect the 
magnitude and statistical significance of 𝛽2 is larger than those of 𝛽3.  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽2𝐹𝑃 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐹𝑃 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2) 
Similarly, to test Hypothesis 4, I focus on acquisitions by large, medium, and small chains. 
Model specification (3) is used to test possible heterogeneous effects of acquisitions of 
independent nursing homes varied by the size of acquiring chains. 𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 is an 
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indicator of post acquisition by large chains for nursing home 𝑖 at year 𝑡, 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑈𝑀 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 is 
the indicator of post acquisition by medium chains for nursing home 𝑖 at year 𝑡, while 
𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the indicator of post acquisition by small chains for nursing home 𝑖 at year 𝑡. 
As the same with models (1) and (2), the control group here are independent nursing homes 
remaining independent throughout the study period. Accordingly, 𝛽4, 𝛽5, and 𝛽6 are the 
coefficients of interest, respectively. I expect the magnitude and statistical significance of 𝛽4 is 
the largest among these three coefficients. 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽4𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑈𝑀 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
+𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3) 
2.6.2 Identification and Endogeneity 
The identification assumption of the DID models stated above is that any systematic 
change in the practice pattern measures is captured by facility-level and county-level controls as 
well as year dummies. Therefore, any time-variant unobservable characteristics which could 
affect the RUGs distribution should not be associated with chain acquisitions. In addition, by 
including the nursing home fixed effects 𝜃𝑖, I control for any time-invariant nursing home 
characteristics such as facility culture or management style which are unobserved in the data but 
could be correlated with practice patterns. In other words, the identification relies on within-
facility variation in chain affiliation over time. 
The main issue of these generalized DID models is the endogeneity of chain acquisitions. 
For example, chains’ decisions on acquisitions may not be random and chains could target 
nursing homes with their practice patterns similar to those of chains. The relevant staffing levels 
such as number of hours spent by therapists with the residents are highly related to the 
distribution of RUG Medicare days and resulting profits. Having a certain level of expectation on 
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the distribution of RUGs for the potential target independent nursing homes could drive the 
chain’s acquisition decision. In addition, unobserved factors such as the relationship between 
owner of the independent nursing home and acquiring chain’s management team may also play 
an important role in acquisition decision. To address the endogeneity issue, I examine the effect 
of acquisitions on practice patterns over time by implementing a dynamic DID model with a set 
of pre- and post-acquisition year terms spanning from two years before acquisitions to two years 
after acquisitions. 
2.6.3 Dynamic model 
The objective of this alternative specification is to examine (1) whether there exists any 
pre-acquisition trend which could mask the true effect of acquisition itself and (2) whether the 
effect (if any) lasts even after the post-acquisition period. I expect to see no particular pre-
acquisition trend in practice patterns. A delayed effect of acquisition on practice patterns is 
possible because it might take time to align the acquiring chain’s objective and culture with 
newly acquired facilities’. More specifically, I estimate the dynamic DID model as follows: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑗−2≤𝑗≤2 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (4) 
The model specification (4) is similar to previous specifications except that the simple 
post-acquisition indicator 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 is replaced by a set of indicators measuring each year ranging 
from two years before acquisition to two years after acquisition. By interacting the treatment 
variable with year dummies, this dynamic model allows for any possible shifts in RUG 
categories to occur both before and after the chain acquisitions. For example, 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡+1 
becomes 1 in the first year after acquisition and 0 otherwise. Similarly, 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 is coded 
as 1 for the year before acquisition and 0 otherwise. The excluded reference category of this 
dynamic model is two or more years before acquisition.   
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2.7 Data 
2.7.1 Datasets 
The empirical analysis utilizes the facility-year level data drawn from nursing homes in the 
United States between 2003 and 2009. More specifically, the data comes from three sources: the 
Online Survey Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) system, Medicare Cost Reports (MCRs) for 
nursing homes and the LTC Focus. Although the Medicare PPS started in July 1998, there was a 
three-phase transition period during which nursing homes could be reimbursed using a mixed 
scheme combining cost-based and PPS approaches. According to the MCRs, year 2003 is the 
first year when all nursing homes started to report their RUG-specific Medicare days (Worksheet 
S-7). In addition, CMS recalibrated and decreased the Medicare payment rates for nursing homes 
in FY2010. Therefore, the study period is from 2003 to 2009. 
Collected and administered by CMS, OSCAR, now known as the Certification and Survey 
Provider Enhanced Reporting (CASPER) system, is an online data system used by the 
government to determine if Medicare/Medicaid certified nursing homes are compliant with 
federal regulations. Every 9 to 15 months, on average 12 months, each federally certified nursing 
home receives an on-site inspection conducted by state agencies. The nursing homes in the 
OSCAR represent about 96% of the total nursing homes in the United States. A typical OSCAR 
survey includes information such as facility structural characteristics, staffing information and 
detailed inspection data. In this study, chain ownership information, profit status, number of 
beds, occupancy rate, ADL index and several staffing measures are extracted from the OSCAR. I 
also construct the chain-adjusted county HHI using the number of beds of each nursing home to 
reflect the competition level within each county market. 
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The information on practice patterns comes from the MCRs for nursing homes. Each 
Medicare-certified nursing home is required to submit its cost report to CMS annually. The 
report includes detailed information on Medicare days by each RUG as well as total Medicare 
days for each nursing home in a year (Worksheet S-7). I use this information to construct the 
proportion of Medicare days billed at different types of RUGs as one of the main dependent 
variables of interest. More specifically, based on the RUG categories presented in Table 2.1, I 
create five dependent variables: % ultra high RUG days, % very high RUG days, % high RUG 
days, % medium RUG days, and % non-therapy RUG days. In addition, to better compare 
heterogeneous effects by profit status or size of chains, I also use the information from 
Worksheet S-7 in the MCRs and the profit information based on the OIG report (OIG, 2015) 
presented in Table 2.1 to construct the single index of the overall therapy-component profit for 
each nursing home. Furthermore, to examine the effects of a change in chain ownership on 
length of stay, I extract the average length of stay of Medicare beneficiaries for each nursing 
home from MCRs (Worksheet S-3). 
Nursing home residents’ demographic characteristics including age, gender, and race are 
extracted from the LTC focus, which is a website maintained at Brown University. It gathers 
aggregated data from a variety of sources such as OSCAR and nursing home residents’ 
assessment data. 
2.7.2 Chain affiliation 
The chain ownership and related transaction information is drawn from the OSCAR. There 
is a text field named “Name of Multi-Facility Organization” in which each nursing home self-
reports its chain affiliation. However, the raw information from this field is subject to reporting 
issues such as typos, abbreviations and other potential inconsistencies over the years. To address 
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these issues, I use the chain variables that were re-coded by Grabowski et al. (2016) in which the 
authors made extensive efforts in cleaning the chain variables to improve the accuracy of the 
chain information. More specifically, the re-coding process tracked nursing homes over time 
using a line-by-line inspection. When inconsistencies or potential errors were detected for a 
nursing home over time, information such as company websites, financial disclosures, 
government reports, or media coverages were used to resolve the issues. 
With the information available for both (1) whether a nursing home is owned by a chain 
and (2) by which chain a nursing home is owned, I further categorize the chains by size and 
profit status because different types of chains may implement heterogeneous strategies for 
acquired nursing homes after transactions. First, using the cleaned chain ownership identifiers, I 
categorize nursing homes into different sizes based on the number of facilities owned by each 
chain. Following the categorization by Grabowski et al. (2016), small chains are defined as 
organizations owning 2 to 10 nursing homes, medium chains are defined as organizations 
owning 11 to 29 facilities, while large chains are defined as owning 30 or more facilities in a 
given year. Second, based on the profit status of the majority facilities within the chain, I 
differentiate for-profit chains from not-for-profit chains. 
2.7.3 Creation of analytical file 
Information from OSCAR, MCRs and LTC Focus are linked using the unique federal 
provider number and year information. Nursing homes in District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, 
Puerto Rico are excluded because the OSCAR data are not complete in these areas. In addition, 
hospital-based nursing homes are excluded because those facilities do not have independent cost 
reports and their cost information is embedded in the affiliated hospitals’ cost reports. 
Furthermore, government-owned nursing homes are excluded because they often have very 
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different patient mix and severity compared to typical nursing homes. Nursing homes reporting 
fewer than 11 residents annually are dropped because LTC Focus is required by the CMS to 
suppress any relevant cells where the nursing home has fewer than 11 residents who have that 
characteristic. 
The final analytical sample includes 13,452 unique nursing homes from 2003 to 2009. Of 
these nursing homes, 34.5% were always independent, 44.5% were always owned by chains, 
while about 21% experienced ownership changes between chains and independent. The 
proportion of independent nursing homes being acquired by chains and that of chain-owned 
nursing homes being divested and becoming independent again were similar. In addition, among 
the nursing homes that experienced chain acquisition events, 91.7% of independent nursing 
homes were acquired by chains just once, 8.1% of nursing homes had two acquisitions (e.g., first 
became a chain-owned facility, then being divested, but later re-joined a chain), and another 
0.2% facilities had three acquisitions.            
2.8 Results 
Figure 2.1 shows the overall trend of different types of RUG days for all nursing homes in 
the sample from 2003 to 2009. The proportion of Medicare days associated with ultra high RUGs 
increased drastically from about 8% in 2003 to 33% in 2009. In contrast, both the proportions of 
Medicare days associated with high RUGs and non-therapy RUGs decreased by 20 and 14 
percentage points during the same period, respectively. In addition, the proportion of very high 
RUG days increased slightly from about 22% to 26% while the proportion of medium RUG days 
fluctuated over time. During the study period, the average number of total Medicare days for a 
nursing home grew steadily from 4057 days in 2003 to 4725 days in 2009, as shown in Figure 
B1. Therefore, the significant shift towards ultra high RUG days was not only reflected in the 
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relative percentages but also the absolute number of Medicare days. Although differing in 
absolute values for each RUG type, this overall trend of shifts in distribution of different types of 
Medicare RUG days also applies to chain-owned and independent nursing homes as well as for-
profit and not-for-profit nursing homes, shown in Figures B2 – B5. 
The trend could be reasonable if other factors such as resident casemix or characteristics 
changed significantly. For example, if more sicker residents were admitted to nursing homes 
over the years, an increase in treatment intensity of therapy services should be expected. 
Therefore, I examine the trend of ADL index and demographic characteristics for nursing home 
residents over time to see if they are coincident with the change in the distribution of different 
RUG types. Table 2.2 shows that neither ADL index nor demographic characteristics for 
residents fluctuated much from 2003 to 2009 although the distribution of RUG groups changed 
dramatically. Therefore, the large industry-wide shift in the proportion of Medicare days across 
RUG types was likely to be driven by strategic decisions at the organizational level and to be less 
relevant to change in clinical factors at the resident level. 
Because this study examines if chain affiliation affects facility practice patterns, I present 
information on chain activities in the nursing home industry in Tables 2.3 and 2.4-2.6. As 
stressed in previous sections, corporate chains play an important role in the nursing home 
industry. In the study sample, the proportion of chain-owned nursing homes slightly dropped 
from 58.8% in 2003 to 56.7% 20091. Similarly, for-profit nursing homes consistently accounted 
for more than 76% of the total nursing homes each year in the sample. About 3% of the total 
                                                 
 
1 Note that because government-owned or hospital affiliated nursing homes are excluded, the sample over-
represents the proportion of chain-owned nursing homes, compared to the national sample, which is about 52% to 
54% (Grabowski et al., 2016). 
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nursing homes were acquired by chains each year. On the other hand, each year, about 89% of 
the nursing homes were not involved in any chain ownership change. Another 8% of nursing 
homes were either divested from chains or switched from one chain to another. On average, as 
shown in Table 2.4, more than 85% of these acquisitions were pursued by for-profit chains. In 
terms of chain sizes, Table 2.5 shows that small chains accounted for more than 50% of the 
acquisitions, while large chains accounted for about 20% of the total acquisitions. To consider 
profit status and chain sizes together, Table 2.6 shows that for-profit small chains consistently 
accounted for the largest share of acquisitions from 2003 to 2009. In addition, for-profit large 
chains played an increasingly important role in acquisitions, ranging from 16.3% of the 
acquisitions in 2003 to 23.6% of the acquisitions in 2009.   
Next, I compare the practice patterns between independent and chain-owned nursing 
homes from 2003 to 2009. The results are presented in Table 2.7. Both the proportions of ultra 
high RUG days and very high RUG days – two most intensive treatment categories, were 
significantly higher among chain-owned nursing homes, compared to those among independent 
nursing homes. Especially, the proportion of ultra high RUG days for chain-owned nursing 
homes was 20.6%, which was 4.6 percentage point higher than that for independent nursing 
homes. In contrast, the proportions of relatively less intensive RUG groups – high, medium, and 
low RUGs, were all lower among chain-owned nursing homes. The comparison in practice 
patterns was also consistent across each year during the study period. In particular, the gap in the 
proportion of ultra high RUG days between these two types of nursing homes increased over the 
study period as well. 
As previously shown in Figure 2.1, the proportion of ultra high RUG days increased 
significantly from 2003 to 2009. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 confirm this trend again by looking at 
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ownership groups separately. To describe the heterogeneity of RUG days across ownership 
groups, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 compare the overall distribution of RUG days across four ownership 
groups in 2003 and 2009, respectively. More specifically, I categorize each nursing home based 
on its profit status and chain affiliation. Compared to other ownership types, for-profit chain-
owned nursing homes had the highest proportions of ultra high RUG days but the lowest 
proportions of medium or high RUG days in both 2003 and 2009. In contrast, not-for-profit 
independent nursing homes consistently had the lowest proportion of ultra high RUG days but 
the highest proportions of high and medium RUG days. Regardless of chain affiliation, 
compared to their not-for-profit counterparts, for-profit nursing homes had higher proportions of 
ultra high RUG days and non-therapy RUG days but lower proportions in high or medium RUG 
days.  
Table 2.8 presents the summary statistics at the baseline year 2003 for nursing homes that 
were ever acquired by any chain and independent nursing homes remaining independent over the 
study period. Compared to independent nursing homes without ownership changes, independent 
nursing homes that were subsequently acquired by chains were more likely to be for-profit 
entities at the baseline. In addition, these acquired nursing homes generally had fewer beds and 
lower occupancy rate but slightly higher proportion of Medicare residents in 2003. In terms of 
staffing level, acquired nursing homes had slightly fewer RN or CNA hours per resident day 
while had higher LPN hours per resident day. Therapy staffing levels were about the same 
between two groups. Furthermore, both acquired and independent nursing homes had residents 
with similar ADL index. The acquired nursing homes had slightly younger and fewer female 
residents. 
 101 
Next, I show a set of pre-acquisition trends for each variable between acquired nursing 
homes and independent nursing homes. The detailed graphics are shown in Figures B6 – B9. 
Most of the variables do not show any particular pre-acquisition trend between these two groups 
of nursing homes. A few exceptions are ADL index, % Medicaid residents, Physical Therapist 
hour per resident day, and Occupational Therapist per resident day. 
In addition to the informal visual inspection of the pre-acquisition trends for the treatment 
and control groups, I also empirically conduct a more formal test by interacting the acquisition 
indicator with year dummies. Essentially, these tests use the same dynamic model as shown in 
Equation (4) by replacing the practice pattern variables with a variety of independent variables 
shown in Figures B6-B9. If the trends between acquired and independent nursing homes are the 
same, then coefficients of t-2 and t-1 should be insignificant, i.e. the difference in differences is 
not significantly different between the acquired and independent nursing homes in the pre-
acquisition period. These formal empirical tests yields similar results to the visual inspections. 
The detailed results are reported in Table B1. In general, most of the variables show similar 
trends between acquired and independent nursing homes. However, there exists some caveats in 
a few variables such as ADL index and payer mix which suggest some differences between the 
two groups, although not being statistically significant. 
Table 2.9 shows the estimation results of changes in RUG distributions from the main DID 
model controlling for facility characteristics, competition at the county level, facility fixed 
effects and year dummies. Columns represent separate regressions on the proportion of each type 
of RUG days, except for low RUGs. Compared to independent nursing homes with no ownership 
change, chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes were associated with about 2.92 
percentage points (𝑝 < 0.01) increase in the proportion of ultra high RUG Medicare days. 
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Throughout the study period, the average proportion of ultra high RUG days was around 15.8 
percent. Therefore, the coefficient of acquisition on increase in the % ultra high RUG days is not 
only statistically significant but also economically meaningful. In contrast, the proportions of 
very high RUGs, high RUGs and non-therapy RUGs are all negatively associated with chain 
acquisitions, with statistically significant magnitudes of -1.63, -0.94 and -0.91 percentage points. 
These shifts in the distribution of RUG Medicare days translate to a significant increase in the 
therapy-specific profit per resident day. More specifically, chain acquisition of independent 
nursing homes is associated with an increase of about 1 in the therapy add-on profitability index 
and it is statistically significant at 0.01 level.   
As a robustness check, I exclude a few facility-level variables such as staffing measures or 
ADL index which may be endogenous to practice patterns of nursing homes in an alternative 
specification but the coefficient of the acquisition barely changes. The results suggest that chain 
acquisitions of independent nursing homes shift the distribution of the RUG categories towards 
the most intensive category and away from the less intensive RUG categories. 
Next, I examine the role of profit status of the acquiring chains in affecting practice 
patterns of acquired nursing homes. As stated in Hypothesis 3, I expect to see a larger effect of 
acquisition if the acquiring chain is for profit. Table 2.10 shows the results. Not surprisingly, the 
overall effect of chain acquisitions on the proportion of ultra high RUG days is mainly through 
for-profit chain acquisitions. More specifically, for-profit chain acquisitions of independent 
nursing homes are associated with 3.6 percentage point increase in the proportion of ultra high 
RUG days. On the other hand, the coefficient of not-for-profit chain acquisitions on the 
proportion of ultra high RUG days is not statistically significant. As shown in Figure 2.1 and 
Table 2.9, there is an overall shift towards the highly intensive RUG days. Table 2.10 provides 
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some additional nuance insights into this trend. Among for-profit chain acquisitions, the shift is 
mainly from proportion of very high RUG days – the second highest reimbursement rate 
category -- to the proportion of ultra high RUG days – the highest reimbursement rate category. 
Among not-for-profit chain acquisitions, the shift is mainly from the proportion of high RUGs – 
the third highest reimbursement rate category – to the proportion of very high RUGs. In addition, 
after for-profit chain acquisitions, there is a 1.3 percentage points decrease in the proportion of 
non-therapy RUGs. Because for-profit chain acquisitions and not-for-profit chain acquisitions 
are associated with shifts in RUG distributions on different margins, it is difficult to compare just 
based on the changes in these RUG categories. Therefore, to standardize the comparison, in the 
last column, I present the results using the constructed therapy-component profit per resident day 
as an indicator for the overall profitability on providing therapy services. As shown, for-profit 
chain acquisitions are significantly associated with 1.2 increase in the overall therapy-component 
profit index per resident day. Based on the formal Wald tests, the difference between coefficients 
of for-profit and not-for-profit chain acquisitions is statistically significant at 0.05 level. 
Therefore, the results suggest that for-profit chains adopted more aggressive billing strategies by 
targeting the most profitable RUG category, compared to not-for-profit chains. 
As indicated in Hypothesis 3, I am also interested in exploring if the chain size matters in 
how chain acquisitions could affect practice patterns of acquired nursing homes. In this analysis, 
chains are categorized into three groups – large, medium and small – based on the number of 
facilities owned by each chain. The control group includes independent nursing homes that 
remained independent. The results are shown in Table 2.11. Although accounting for about 20% 
of the total acquisitions, large chain acquisitions have a significantly stronger association with 
acquired facilities’ practice patterns. The proportion of ultra high RUGs for an average 
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independent nursing home increased by 8.7 percentage points after being acquired by a large 
chain, compared to independent facilities without chain acquisitions. Similarly, acquisitions by 
medium chains are associated with about 3.3 percentage points increase in the proportion of ultra 
high RUG days. Acquisitions by small chains, although accounting for about 50% of the total 
acquisitions, correlate with acquired nursing homes’ practice patterns by 1.3 percentage points. 
In terms of the therapy-component profit index, large chain acquisitions are associated with a 
2.75 increase in the therapy profit index per resident day, followed by medium chain acquisitions 
at about 1.3, while small chain acquisitions do not seem to affect this composite measure. The 
formal Wald tests suggest these coefficients are statistically different from each other at the 
conventional level. 
The results from the generalized DID model provides little additional insights on the 
dynamics of chain acquisitions and change in RUG category distribution. For example, if there 
was a pre-acquisition trend in changing RUG distribution, it could complicate the interpretation 
of the acquisition effects observed in the generalized DID specification. To explore these 
dynamics, I examine the effect of chain acquisitions over time. Table 2.12 presents the detailed 
results from this dynamic model with leads and lags, as indicated in model specification (4). 
Most of the RUG categories do not show any significant pre-acquisition trend. For example, the 
proportions of very high RUGs, high and non-therapy RUGs did not decrease until the 
acquisition year. However, in the year prior to acquisition, targeted independent nursing homes 
had already started to increase the proportion of ultra high RUGs by 2.47 percentage points, 
compared to two or more years before the acquisition. This also leads to a significant increase of 
0.76 in the therapy add-on profit index in one year prior to the acquisition, compared two or 
more years before the acquisition. In addition, the persistent post-acquisition effects on ultra 
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high, very high and high RUGs suggest that acquisitions could affect the practice patterns of 
these previously independent nursing homes several years even after acquisitions. 
To sum up findings on the relationship between chain acquisition and change in 
distribution of RUG categories, I find suggestive evidence that previously independent nursing 
homes significantly increased their proportion of ultra high RUG days while decreasing the 
proportions of very high and non-therapy RUG days after being acquired by corporate chains, 
compared to other independent facilities that did not experience chain ownership change. The 
effects are concentrated among for-profit chain acquisitions than not-for-profit chain 
acquisitions. Furthermore, together accounting for nearly 50% of the acquisitions, large and 
medium chains had stronger impacts on acquired facilities in changing the distribution of RUG 
categories than small chains did. However, keep in mind that there is one caveat that the dynamic 
model with leads and lags relative to the acquisition year indicates that the increase in proportion 
of ultra high RUG days occurred one year before acquisition.  
After establishing the association between chain acquisition and practice patterns on RUG 
categories, I explore if chain acquisitions had any association on length of stay for Medicare 
beneficiaries in acquired nursing homes. From 2003 to 2009, the average Medicare length of stay 
in the sample was about 28 days. Figure 2.4 breaks down the number by ownership groups and 
years. In general, not-for-profit facilities slightly decreased length of stay, while for-profit 
facilities slightly increased the measure from 2003 to 2009. On average, the average length of 
stay among for-profit nursing homes was about 5 days longer than that in not-for-profit nursing 
homes. Remember that as shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, the proportion of ultra high RUG days 
increased across all of the ownership categories between 2003 and 2009. Although for-profit 
facilities had higher proportion of ultra high RUGs than not-for-profits, the Medicare length of 
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stay among for-profits continued to increase from 2003 to 2009 compared to the slightly 
decreasing trend observed among not-for-profits. 
The results from the DID model on Medicare length of stay are presented in Table 2.13. 
Similar to the analysis for practice patterns, results from three specifications are presented: (1) 
only controlling for the year trend and facility fixed effects; (2) adding county HHI control; (3) 
adding facility controls and county HHI control. Because the results are robust across all three 
specifications, I report the results from the specification using the full control from here on. As 
shown, the effect of chain acquisition on average Medicare length of stay was about an increase 
of 0.21 days but not statistically significant (𝑝 > 0.10). I also break down the analysis on length 
of stay by profit status and size of the acquiring chains and show the results in Table 2.14. Most 
of the types of chain acquisitions did not significantly affect Medicare length of stay. Only not-
for-profit chain acquisitions were marginally ( 𝑝 < 0.10) associated with one day decrease in the 
length of stay. In general, the effects of chain acquisition on Medicare length of stay are 
imprecise. However, the signs of the estimates suggest that for-profit and chains were positively 
associated with length of stay for Medicare beneficiaries in nursing homes during the study 
period. It is further confirmed by adding the leads and lags to the preferred specification as 
shown in Table B2. 
2.9 Discussion and Conclusion 
Nursing home chains own more than half of the nursing homes in the United States. For 
decades, whether chains affect various aspects of nursing homes -- such as quality of care, 
staffing, and financial health -- have been concerns for policymakers and researchers. It is well 
known that the Medicare PPS creates financial incentives for nursing homes to categorize 
patients into RUG codes with higher reimbursement rates so higher profits can be achieved. Both 
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the Medicare reimbursement scheme and chains play important roles in shaping the landscape of 
nursing home industry. However, to my knowledge, there are no studies that explored the 
relationship between chain affiliation and strategic practice patterns of nursing homes. The era of 
Medicare PPS for nursing homes provides an ideal setting to investigate this relationship. More 
specifically, this study tracks chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes from 2003 to 
2009 to explore whether previously independent nursing homes would change their billing 
practice patterns after being acquired by nursing home chains. 
My results suggest that chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes are associated 
with a higher proportion of residents being categorized into the most profitable RUG level. This 
relationship varies with types of ownership. More specifically, independent nursing homes that 
were acquired by large corporate chains placed a higher proportion of residents in the highest 
reimbursed RUG category than medium or small chains. Similarly, the increase in proportion of 
residents being categorized into the ultra high RUGs is larger after FP chains acquisitions, 
compared to NFP chains acquisitions. I also find that the chain effects on this aggressive billing 
patterns may last for several years after the acquisitions. Although chain acquisitions of 
independent nursing homes are found to be positively associated with an increase in the 
proportion of residents being put in the higher-paying RUGs for acquired nursing homes, these 
acquisitions do not seem to significantly change the length of stay. 
Overall, my results are consistent with previous literature which found that healthcare 
providers’ responses to financial incentives created by payment or regulation changes vary 
across organizational ownerships. For example, both Silverman and Skinner (2004) and Dafny 
(2005) found that for-profit hospitals were more likely to engage in upcoding behaviors. In the 
home health industry, for-profit incumbents (Kim and Norton, 2015) were found to respond 
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strategically in practice patterns following entrants in the same market. Similarly, both for-profit 
(Kim and Norton, 2017) and chain-owned (Kim and Huang, 2017) home health agencies were 
more likely to adopt strategic practice patterns than were not-for-profits or independents. 
Focusing on the nursing home industry, Bowblis et al. (2016) concluded that for-profit nursing 
homes place a significantly higher proportion of patients in the highest reimbursed RUG 
categories than not-for-profits. 
This study contributes to the existing literature about healthcare providers’ upcoding 
behaviors and regulatory exploitation. To my knowledge, this is the first study that estimates the 
effects of chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes on strategic billing practice patterns. 
Although large corporate chains were linked to several high-profile lawsuits regarding their 
questionable billing practices, no prior studies are found to systematically examine this issue 
using the national nursing home data. Second, I find substantial heterogeneity within types of 
acquiring chains. Compared to smaller and not-for-profit chains, larger and for-profit acquiring 
chains had stronger influence on the strategic billing practices of acquired independent nursing 
homes. In addition, I find that the effects of chain acquisition on strategic billing practices for 
acquired independent nursing homes do not only exist just one year after acquisitions. Rather, 
these post-acquisition effects last for several years, especially for the proportion of residents 
being categorized into the ultra high RUGs. Also note that one caveat of the findings is that 
chains were likely to target independent nursing homes even before the actual acquisitions, 
evident by the significant increase in the proportion of ultra high RUG days one year before 
acquisitions. This finding poses another research question: why these independent facilities 
became the targets of acquisitions? Did they desperately try to change their RUG mix to improve 
their financial performance so they could at least maintain their daily operations? Or, did they 
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improve these measures to show potential buyers that they were still worth buying? Given these 
limited evidences, future research could focus on why these independent facilities were acquired 
at the first place.   
This paper has several limitations. First, the measure of the practice pattern is the 
proportion of different types of RUG Medicare days. Although this measure can reasonably 
proxy for the change in distribution across different RUG types, it does not accurately reflect the 
potential gaming behaviors such as manipulating the amount of therapy minutes to move 
residents’ RUG categories up. A more accurate assessment of the upcoding behavior could be 
achieved by utilizing both the residents’ assessment files and Medicare’s claim data. Second, the 
perspective of clinical outcomes is lacking in this study. For example, measures such as 
improvement in function ability or discharge locations would be helpful in more 
comprehensively evaluating the welfare implications of changes in practice patterns due to chain 
acquisition of independent nursing homes. If an increase in the proportion of residents in the 
most intensive RUGs category is associated with significant improvement in functional status or 
an increase in the probability of residents being discharged back to their homes or communities, 
the observed shift toward more profitable RUG categories might not a be purely artificial 
upcoding practice, which could have some welfare implications. Unfortunately, the datasets used 
in this study do not contain such information. Third, the data on chain acquisitions comes from 
the OSCAR. Because the survey is not strictly enforced in a timely fashion, nursing homes often 
report information on ownership changes months after the actual transactions occur. As a result, 
the timing of chain acquisitions might not be accurate. This limitation might also contribute to 
the findings that target nursing homes already increased the proportion of ultra high RUG days 
one year before the acquisition. Unfortunately, to what extent this limitation could bias the 
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results is unknown given that OSCAR is the only resource available for comprehensively 
examining chain ownerships in the nursing home industry. In the future, the federal government 
should find ways to improve the accuracy of ownership information reported in the OSCAR. 
In conclusion, this study identifies a strong increasing trend of proportion of post-acute 
residents being categorized into more profitable RUGs among all nursing homes in the United 
States from 2003 to 2009 – a period after the implementation of Medicare PPS. Substantial 
heterogeneities exist in this strategic billing practice patterns between independent and chain-
owned nursing homes. Using a unique dataset that identifies the chain acquisitions of 
independent nursing homes during the period between 2003 and 2009, I track the changes in the 
practice patterns both before and after the chain acquisitions. I find that chain acquisitions of 
independent nursing homes were associated with 2.92 percentage points increase in the 
proportion of residents being categorized into the highest therapy treatment level. A more 
dynamic model suggests that the chain effects on this aggressive billing practice may last for 
several years after the acquisition. In addition, I find that the main effects are mostly due to 
acquisitions by large for-profit corporate chains. However, an increase in treatment intensity 
among chain-affiliated nursing homes does not seem to decrease the length of stay of Medicare 
beneficiaries in nursing homes. 
In 2009, about one-quarter of the nursing homes’ medical claims were found to have errors 
primarily due to the upcoding issue, which resulted in about $1.5 billion in inappropriate 
Medicare payments to nursing homes (OIG, 2015). Since the implementation of Medicare PPS, 
the federal government has increasingly focused on the issue of inappropriate Medicare 
payments to nursing homes. This study provides the empirical evidence showing that nursing 
home chains, especially those for-profit and large chains, were more likely to affect the billing 
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practice patterns of acquired independent nursing homes. The findings of this study continue to 
stress the importance of the federal government to closely monitor the chain related transactions 
in the nursing home industry. In particular, given the limited government resources, large 
corporate chains should be the particular monitoring targets for the purpose of financial fraud 
and suspicious medical upcoding behaviors. 
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2.11 Figures  
Figure 2. 1 Overall trend of different types of RUGs from 2003 to 2009 
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 2009. 
Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; or (3) 
facilities with missing values in RUG Medicare days. 
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Figure 2. 2 Comparison in RUG distribution among different ownership groups 2003 
 
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 
2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; 
or (3) facilities with missing values in RUG Medicare days. 
 
Figure 2. 3 Comparison in RUG distribution among different ownership groups 2009 
 
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 
2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; 
or (3) facilities with missing values in RUG Medicare days. 
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Figure 2. 4 Average Medicare length of stay by ownership categories 2003-2009 
 
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 
2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; 
or (3) facilities with missing values in RUG Medicare days. 
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2.12 Tables 
Table 2. 1 Average payment and cost of the therapy component per patient day, by level of 
RUGs as of year 2012 
Therapy level Minimum 
therapy 
minutes 
Average payments 
per day 
Average 
expense per 
day 
Average 
profit per 
day 
Marginal 
profit 
per day 
Ultra high 720 $231 $165 $66 $21 
Very high 500 $156 $111 $45 $15 
High 325 $104 $74 $30 $11 
Medium 150 $67 $48 $19 $8 
Low 45 $37 $26 $11 N/A 
Source: OIG analysis of SNF cost reports, 2015. 
 
Table 2. 2 Trend of selected residents characteristics for all nursing homes in the sample by 
year 
 ADL index Age % White % Female 
2003 10.79 81.34 85.03 72.89 
2004 10.78 81.19 84.69 72.49 
2005 10.79 81.04 84.35 72.24 
2006 10.80 80.95 83.98 71.89 
2007 10.81 80.88 83.62 71.54 
2008 10.82 80.72 83.90 71.23 
2009 10.84 80.62 83.60 70.70 
N 79890    
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 
2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; 
or (3) facilities with missing values in RUG Medicare days. 
 
Table 2. 3 Types of ownership and prevalence of acquisitions in the nursing home industry 
 % Chain-
owned NHs 
% for-profit 
NHs 
% Chain 
acquisitions of 
independent 
NHs 
Total NHs 
2003 58.78 76.51 2.63 10994 
2004 57.02 75.95 2.76 10997 
2005 56.85 75.91 3.24 11063 
2006 56.44 76.27 3.18 11157 
2007 56.59 76.75 3.24 11158 
2008 56.85 76.68 3.38 12246 
2009 56.67 76.64 2.76 12275 
N 79890    
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 
2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; 
or (3) facilities with missing values in RUG Medicare days.  
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Table 2. 4 Chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes 2003-2009: by profit status of 
the acquiring chains 
Year For-profit acquisition Not-for-profit acquisition Total 
2003 247 85.47% 42 14.53% 289 
2004 258 84.87% 46 15.13% 304 
2005 314 87.71% 44 12.29% 358 
2006 302 85.07% 53 14.93% 355 
2007 317 87.57% 45 12.43% 362 
2008 348 84.06% 66 15.94% 414 
2009 293 86.43% 46 13.57% 339 
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 
2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; 
or (3) facilities with missing values in RUG Medicare days. 
 
Table 2. 5 Chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes 2003-2009: by size of the 
acquiring chains 
Year  Small chains (2-10) Medium chains (11-29) Large chains (>=30) Total 
2003 187 64.71% 54 18.69% 48 16.61% 289 
2004 228 75.00% 38 12.50% 38 12.50% 304 
2005 244 68.16% 59 16.48% 55 15.36% 358 
2006 203 57.18% 97 27.32% 55 15.49% 355 
2007 186 51.38% 87 24.03% 89 24.59% 362 
2008 206 49.76% 97 23.43% 111 26.81% 414 
2009 184 54.28% 74 21.83% 81 23.89% 339 
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 
2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; 
or (3) facilities with missing values in RUG Medicare days. 
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Table 2. 6 Chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes 2003-2009: by profit status and 
size of the acquiring chains 
Year  For-profit small (2-10) For-profit medium (11-29) For-profit large (>=30) Total 
2003 152 52.60% 48 16.61% 47 16.26% 289 
2004 187 61.51% 35 11.51% 36 11.84% 304 
2005 207 57.82% 55 15.36% 52 14.53% 358 
2006 156 43.94% 91 25.63% 55 15.49% 355 
2007 150 41.44% 78 21.55% 89 24.59% 362 
2008 156 37.68% 82 19.81% 110 26.57% 414 
2009 147 43.36% 66 19.47% 80 23.60% 339 
 
Year  Not-for-profit 
 small (2-10) 
Not-for-profit 
 medium (11-29) 
Not-for-profit  
large (>=30) 
Total 
2003 35 12.11% 6 2.08% 1 0.35% 289 
2004 41 13.49% 3 0.99% 2 0.66% 304 
2005 37 10.34% 4 1.12% 3 0.84% 358 
2006 47 13.24% 6 1.69% 0 0.00% 355 
2007 36 9.94% 9 2.49% 0 0.00% 362 
2008 50 12.08% 15 3.62% 1 0.24% 414 
2009 37 10.91% 8 2.36% 1 0.29% 339 
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 
2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; 
or (3) facilities with missing values in RUG Medicare days. 
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Table 2. 7 Comparison on practice patterns between independent and chain-owned NHs 
2003-2009 
 Independent Chain-owned 
Proportion of ultra high RUG days 0.158 0.205*** 
 (0.199) (0.207) 
Proportion of very high RUG days 0.239 0.258*** 
 (0.165) (0.137) 
Proportion of high RUG days 0.225 0.194*** 
 (0.168) (0.148) 
Proportion of medium RUG days 0.205 0.176*** 
 (0.159) (0.128) 
Proportion of low RUG days 0.00370 0.00240*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0103) 
Proportion of none therapy days 0.170 0.165*** 
 (0.159) (0.134) 
Observations 34339 45551 
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 
2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; 
or (3) facilities with missing values in RUG Medicare days. Stars indicate the statistical significance based on the t-tests between 
each of the categories. The reference group is independent nursing homes. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 2. 8 Summary statistics for treatment and control nursing homes in year 2003 
 Acquired NHs  Independent NHs 
Facility structural characteristics   
For profit 0.77*** 0.62 
 (0.42) (0.48) 
Bed size 115.42** 122.07 
 (55.01) (73.56) 
Occupancy rate 0.86*** 0.88 
 (0.13) (0.11) 
ADL index 10.81 10.78 
 (1.07) (1.20) 
% Medicare 11.62*** 10.45 
 (8.32) (9.01) 
% Medicaid 63.34 62.48 
 (19.43) (21.84) 
Facility Staffing measures   
Registered Nurse hours per resident day 0.29*** 0.34 
 (0.25) (0.24) 
Licensed Practical Nurse hours per resident 
day 
0.73*** 0.68 
 (0.30) (0.29) 
Certified Nurse Aide hours per resident day 2.17*** 2.28 
 (0.69) (0.69) 
Physical Therapist hours per resident day 0.05** 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Occupational Therapist hours per resident 
day 
0.05*** 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Facility demographic characteristics   
Age 81.43*** 82.42 
 (5.82) (5.64) 
White 85.30 86.10 
 (18.99) (20.44) 
Female 73.34** 74.35 
 (10.52) (10.85) 
County characteristics   
HHI 0.17 0.16 
 (0.20) (0.21) 
Observations 650 3282 
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 
2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; 
or (3) facilities with missing values in RUG Medicare days. Treatment nursing homes are independent nursing homes that were 
acquired once and were not involved in other types of chain transactions during the study period. Control nursing homes are 
independent nursing homes that remained independent during the study period. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2. 9 Generalized DID estimates on % RUGs 2003-2009 
 Ultra high 
RUGs 
Very high 
RUGs 
High RUGs Medium 
RUGs 
Non-
therapy 
RUGs 
Therapy 
profit 
Acquisition 0.0292*** -0.0163*** -0.0094** 0.0052 -0.0091** 1.0112*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.27] 
For profit 0.0219*** -0.0105* -0.0068 -0.0076 0.0025 0.6303* 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.33] 
Bed size 0.0005*** -0.0002* -0.0000 -0.0002* -0.0001 0.0196*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
Occupancy 
rate 
0.0664*** -0.0204 -0.0203 -0.0275** 0.0001 2.3431*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.73] 
ADL index 0.0007 -0.0035*** -0.0014 0.0020* 0.0021* -0.1174 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.07] 
% Medicare 0.0009*** 0.0006*** -0.0008*** -0.0004*** -0.0002** 0.0540*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
% Medicaid -0.0000 0.0002** -0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0001 0.0012 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
RN hours 
PPD 
0.0222*** -0.0070 -0.0144** -0.0039 0.0019 0.6565* 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.37] 
LPN hours 
PPD 
0.0140*** -0.0056 -0.0078* 0.0013 -0.0027 0.4681* 
 [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.26] 
CNA hours 
PPD 
-0.0020 -0.0006 0.0016 0.0010 0.0001 -0.0921 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.10] 
PT hours 
PPD 
0.0323** 0.0109 -0.0177** -0.0218*** -0.0039 1.6826* 
 [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.97] 
OT hours 
PPD 
0.0282* 0.0062 -0.0074 -0.0133* -0.0131* 1.6578* 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.89] 
Age 0.0028*** 0.0000 -0.0023*** -0.0004 -0.0003 0.1106*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] 
White -0.0015*** 0.0009*** 0.0000 0.0006*** 0.0000 -0.0485*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
Female 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0029 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
County HHI 0.0030 -0.0183 -0.0069 -0.0026 0.0198 -0.8262 
 [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.80] 
Observations 29940 29940 29940 29940 29940 29940 
Standard errors in brackets. Constant terms, year fixed effects estimated but not reported. The sample includes all nursing 
homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) 
facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; or (3) facilities with missing values in 
RUG Medicare days. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2. 10 The role of profit status 
 Ultra high 
RUGs 
Very high 
RUGs 
High 
RUGs 
Medium 
RUGs 
Non-
therapy 
RUGs 
Therapy 
profit 
For-profit chain 
acquisition 
0.0360*** -0.0260*** -0.0050 0.0064 -0.0125*** 1.1915*** 
 [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.31] 
Not-for-profit 
chain acquisition 
0.0027 0.0191** -0.0276*** -0.0003 0.0083 0.1800 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.46] 
Observations 29940 29940 29940 29940 29940 29940 
Standard errors in brackets. Constant terms, year fixed effects estimated but not reported. The sample includes all nursing 
homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) 
facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; or (3) facilities with missing values in 
RUG Medicare days. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 2. 11 The role of chain size 
 Ultra high 
RUGs 
Very high 
RUGs 
High 
RUGs 
Medium 
RUGs 
Non-
therapy 
RUGs 
Therapy 
profit 
Small chain 
acquisitions 
0.0127** -0.0094* -0.0066 0.0101** -0.0071 0.4124 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.31] 
Medium chain 
acquisitions 
0.0332*** -0.0128* -0.0127* 0.0031 -0.0112* 1.2982*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.50] 
Lager chain 
acquisitions 
0.0866*** -0.0493*** -0.0175* -0.0122* -0.0082 2.7480*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.61] 
Observations 29940 29940 29940 29940 29940 29940 
Large chain: 30 or more facilities; Medium chain: 11-29 facilities; Small chain: 2-10 facilities. Standard errors in 
brackets. Constant terms, year fixed effects estimated but not reported. The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR 
with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, 
HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; or (3) facilities with missing values in RUG Medicare days. * p 
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2. 12 Effects of chain acquisitions on % RUGs 2003-2009 (dynamic model) 
 Ultra high 
RUGs 
Very high 
RUGs 
High 
RUGs 
Medium 
RUGs 
Non-therapy 
RUGs 
Therapy 
profit index 
t-2 0.0089 -0.0088 -0.0055 -0.0002 0.0052 0.0276 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.38] 
t-1 0.0247*** -0.0099 -0.0096 -0.0076 0.0019 0.7598** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.38] 
t 0.0371*** -0.0146** -0.0110* -0.0007 -0.0114** 1.4561*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.37] 
t+1 0.0462*** -0.0243*** -
0.0224*** 
0.0010 -0.0015 1.3153*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.41] 
t+2 0.0458*** -0.0328*** -0.0140** 0.0034 -0.0030 1.1982*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.46] 
2+ years 
post 
0.0412*** -0.0382*** -0.0128* 0.0157** -0.0070 0.9232** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.46] 
For profit 0.0221*** -0.0107* -0.0069 -0.0076 0.0026 0.6355* 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.33] 
Bed size 0.0005*** -0.0002* -0.0000 -0.0002* -0.0001 0.0199*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
Occupancy 
rate 
0.0668*** -0.0207 -0.0204 -0.0277** 0.0002 2.3596*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.73] 
ADL index 0.0007 -0.0036*** -0.0014 0.0021* 0.0021* -0.1191 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.07] 
% Medicare 0.0009*** 0.0006*** -
0.0008*** 
-0.0004*** -0.0002** 0.0540*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
% Medicaid -0.0000 0.0002** -
0.0003*** 
0.0000 0.0001 0.0014 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
RN hours 
PPD 
0.0225*** -0.0072 -0.0146** -0.0039 0.0021 0.6615* 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.37] 
LPN hours 
PPD 
0.0140*** -0.0057 -0.0079* 0.0014 -0.0027 0.4672* 
 [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.26] 
CNA hours 
PPD 
-0.0020 -0.0006 0.0016 0.0009 0.0001 -0.0910 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.10] 
PT hours 
PPD 
0.0320** 0.0109 -0.0176** -0.0216** -0.0039 1.6672* 
 [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.97] 
OT hours 
PPD 
0.0282* 0.0061 -0.0074 -0.0132* -0.0130* 1.6558* 
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 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.89] 
Age 0.0028*** -0.0000 -
0.0023*** 
-0.0003 -0.0003 0.1103*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] 
White -0.0015*** 0.0009*** 0.0000 0.0006*** 0.0000 -0.0486*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
Female 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0031 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
County HHI 0.0021 -0.0172 -0.0063 -0.0029 0.0193 -0.8231 
 [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.80] 
Observations 29940 29940 29940 29940 29940 29940 
Standard errors in brackets. Constant terms, year fixed effects estimated but not reported. The sample includes all nursing 
homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) 
facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; or (3) facilities with missing values in 
RUG Medicare days. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2. 13 Generalized DID estimates on average Medicare length of stay 2003-2009 
 (1) (2) (3) 
acquisition 0.2535 0.2534 0.2079 
 [0.31] [0.31] [0.31] 
county HHI No Yes Yes 
    
Facility controls No No Yes 
Observations 28021 28021 28021 
R2 0.632 0.632 0.635 
Standard errors in brackets. Constant terms, year fixed effects estimated but not reported. The sample includes all nursing 
homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) 
facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; or (3) facilities with missing values in 
RUG Medicare days. Column (1) includes only year dummies with no other controls; column (2) adds county controls; column 
(3) adds facility-level characteristics. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 2. 14 The role of profit status and chain size on the effects of chain acquisitions on 
Medicare length of stay 2003-2009 
 For-profit 
acquisitions 
Not-for-
profit 
acquisitions 
Large chain 
acquisitions 
Medium chain 
acquisitions 
Small chain 
acquisitions 
Effects on 
Medicare length 
of stay 
0.5190 -1.0030* 0.2347 0.3218 0.1375 
 [0.35] [0.60] [0.67] [0.56] [0.38] 
Observations 28021 28021 28021 28021 28021 
Standard errors in brackets. Constant terms, year fixed effects estimated but not reported. The sample includes all nursing 
homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) 
facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; or (3) facilities with missing values in 
RUG Medicare days. Facility-level characteristics and county HHI are controlled but not reported here.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
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2.13 Appendix 
 Figure B 1. Total Medicare days by RUG types from 2003 to 2009 
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Figure B 2. Overall trend of RUG categories 2003-2009 (chain owned nursing homes only) 
 
 
Figure B 3. Overall trend of RUG categories 2003-2009 (independent nursing homes only) 
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Figure B 4. Overall trend of RUG categories 2003-2009 (For-profit nursing homes only) 
 
Figure B 5. Overall trend of RUG categories 2003-2009 (Not-for-profit nursing homes only) 
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Figure B 6. Comparison of pre-acquisition trends of RUG categories between acquired 
nursing homes and independent nursing homes 
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Figure B 7. Comparison of pre-acquisition trends of facility structural characteristics 
between acquired nursing homes and independent nursing homes 
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Figure B 8. Comparison of pre-acquisition trends of staffing measures between acquired 
nursing homes and independent nursing homes 
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Figure B 9. Comparison of pre-acquisition trends of demographic characteristics and county 
HHI between acquired nursing homes and independent nursing homes 
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Table B 1 Wald tests for parallel trends 
 t-2 t-1 t 
For profit 0.0047 [0.01] -0.009 [0.01] 0.0159 [0.01] 
Bed size 0.3005 [0.53] -0.2207 [0.47] -0.3564 [0.46] 
Occupancy rate -0.0037 [0.00] -0.0048 [0.00] -0.0125*** [0.00] 
ADL Index 0.0286 [0.04] 0.0231 [0.04] 0.0976*** [0.04] 
% Medicare 0.0746 [0.41] 0.6078 [0.41] 0.4569 [0.40] 
% Medicaid -0.394 [0.51] -0.8958 [0.56] -0.2826 [0.51] 
HHI 0.0035 [0.00] 0.0046 [0.00] 0 [0.00] 
RN hours per resident day -0.0089 [0.01] -0.0088 [0.01] 0.0017 [0.01] 
LPN hours per resident day 0.0023 [0.01] -0.0017 [0.01] -0.0107 [0.01] 
CNA hours per resident day -0.0540** [0.03] -0.0373 [0.03] -0.0613** [0.02] 
PT hours per resident day 0.0022 [0.01] 0.0129 [0.01] 0.0136 [0.01] 
OT hours per resident day -0.0025 [0.00] 0.0046 [0.00] 0.0049 [0.01] 
Age -0.1205 [0.10] -0.1278 [0.10] -0.1071 [0.10] 
White 0.049 [0.23] -0.2112 [0.22] -0.1776 [0.22] 
Female -0.4266 [0.28] -0.3575 [0.28] -0.3755 [0.26] 
Observations 29940 29940 29940 29940 29940 29940 
Standard errors in brackets. Constant terms, year fixed effects estimated but not reported. The sample includes all nursing 
homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) 
facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; or (3) facilities with missing values in 
RUG Medicare days. Facility-level characteristics and county HHI are controlled but not reported here.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
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Table B 2 Effects of chain acquisitions on Medicare length of stay 2003-2009 (dynamic 
model) 
 Average Medicare length of stay 
t-2 -0.9268** 
 [0.47] 
t-1 -0.5981 
 [0.47] 
t -0.2967 
 [0.45] 
t+1 -0.2166 
 [0.49] 
t+2 -0.4093 
 [0.53] 
More than 2 years after acquisitions -0.1825 
 [0.54] 
For profit 4.0978*** 
 [0.42] 
Bed size 0.0089 
 [0.01] 
Occupancy rate 4.4940*** 
 [0.88] 
ADL index 0.0403 
 [0.09] 
% Medicare 0.0248*** 
 [0.01] 
% Medicaid 0.0101 
 [0.01] 
RN hours PPD -0.9788** 
 [0.43] 
LPN hours PPD -0.2806 
 [0.29] 
CNA hours PPD 0.0619 
 [0.11] 
PT hours PPD 0.7017 
 [0.61] 
OT hours PPD 0.4786* 
 [0.27] 
Age -0.0111 
 [0.04] 
White -0.0344** 
 [0.02] 
Female -0.0114 
 [0.01] 
County HHI 0.6347 
 [1.15] 
Observations 28021 
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Standard errors in brackets. Constant terms, year fixed effects estimated but not reported. The sample includes all nursing 
homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs and LTC Focus from 2003 to 2009. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) 
facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; or (3) facilities with missing values in 
RUG Medicare days. Facility-level characteristics and county HHI are controlled but not reported here.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01  
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Chapter 3 The role of financial performance on chain acquisition of 
independent nursing homes 
3.1 Introduction 
In the United States, nursing homes are the predominant institutional providers of long-
term care. The aging of the population poses a major challenge for nursing homes to meet the 
increasing demand for elder care. In the past two decades, a tremendous amount of chain related 
transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions, occurred within the nursing home industry 
(Grabowski et al., 2016). Quality of care has been a serious concern behind these chain-related 
transactions for both the federal government (Department of Health and Human Services, 2009; 
GAO, 2010, 2011) and health policy researchers (Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002; Stevenson and 
Grabowski, 2008; Harrington et al., 2012; Grabowski et al., 2016). Therefore, it is important to 
understand the motivation behind these chain acquisitions. Although a large body of literature 
focuses on the relationship between chain affiliation and nursing home performance, relatively 
few studies have examined factors associated with chain acquisition of independent nursing 
homes in the past two decades. Given the prominent role of chains in the nursing home industry, 
it is important to understand the antecedents of chain acquisitions. Furthermore, surprisingly, 
financial performance has been largely ignored in studies that examined factors contributing to 
chain acquisitions. Evidence suggests that ownership conversions could be driven by financial 
stress of the targeted facilities (Sloan et al., 2003; Pozniak et al., 2010; Bowblis, 2011). Using a 
nuanced longitudinal dataset that tracks chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes in the 
United States from 2000 to 2010, this study investigates the factors associated with chain 
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acquisitions of independent nursing homes, with a special focus on financial performance of 
targeted independent nursing homes. 
Prior research related to nursing homes largely focused on ownership conversions between 
for-profit and not-for-profit (Grabowski and Stevenson, 2008; Bowblis, 2011), nursing home 
closures (Castle, 2005, 2009; Zinn et al., 2009; Bowblis, 2011), acquisitions of chain-owned 
nursing homes by large private investment firms (Cadigan et al., 2015), or chain acquisitions 
without considering financial performance of targeted nursing homes (Banaszak-Holl et al., 
2002; Grabowski et al., 2016). Most of the previous studies focused on the effects of 
organizational ownership changes, but not the antecedents of ownership changes. Among the few 
studies that explored the predictors of ownership changes, Banaszak-Holl et al. (2002) did not 
examine financial performance and focused on chain acquisitions prior to 1997. Bowblis (2011) 
examined ownership conversions between for-profits and not-for-profits, which accounts for a 
small portion of ownership changes, compared to chain-related transactions. Cadigan et al. 
(2015) found that private investment acquisitions of chain-owned nursing homes had little 
impact on the financial performance of nursing homes. However, in that study, the authors 
focused on private investment and whole-chain transactions, which is conceptually different 
from this study’s focus: chain’s acquisition of independent nursing homes. To sum up, this study 
aims to fill the research gaps by (1) exploring the relationship between financial performance and 
chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes, and (2) using a more recent longitudinal data 
tracking nursing home chain acquisitions from 2000 to 2010. In particular, this study focuses on 
chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes in the United States. In addition, this study 
explores heterogeneities in chain acquisitions by chain size. 
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In the United States, nursing homes are heavily regulated by both federal and state 
governments. There are about 15,600 nursing homes serving roughly 1.4 million elderly on any 
given day (National Center for Health Statistics, 2015). Expenditures on nursing facilities across 
the country were about $160 billion in 2014 and projected to reach $270 billion in 2023 (Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014). Medicare and Medicaid together pay nearly 80% of 
the total nursing home costs, while private insurance payments and out-of-pocket payments 
account for the rest (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013). In contrast to the hospital industry, the 
nursing home industry is primarily dominated by for-profit facilities, which account for about 
two thirds of all nursing homes; while not-for-profit organizations and government together own 
just about 32% of total nursing home facilities (Harrington et al., 2011). Furthermore, chains 
own over 50% of the nursing homes in the United States (Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002; Harrington 
et al., 2011; Grabowski et al., 2016; Hirth et al., 2017).  
Federal payment policies and states’ legal environments have changed dramatically in the 
nursing home industry during the past two decades. Since the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 
Medicare changed its payment system for nursing homes from a cost-plus approach to the 
Prospective Payment System. Evidence shows this change affected nursing homes’ financial 
health (Qaseem et al., 2007): Five of the ten largest nursing home chains filed for bankruptcy by 
the year 2000 (Kitchener et al., 2005). Since then, private investment firms started entering the 
nursing home market by purchasing several large nursing home chains (Stevenson and 
Grabowski, 2008). In addition, nursing homes faced increasing liability costs and malpractice 
premiums in some states (Galloro, 2000). As a response, nursing homes have been constructing 
more complex ownership structures so they could minimize the risk of bearing legal punishments 
(Stevenson et al., 2006; Stevenson and Grabowski, 2008). 
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These policy and market factors might contribute to the nursing home industry fluctuation 
that involved a non-trivial amount of organizational ownership changes (Dalton and Howard, 
2000). During the 1990s, the proportion of chain-owned nursing homes constantly increased 
from 39% in 1991 to 51% in 2000 (Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002; Grabowski et al., 2016). 
Interestingly, in the past decade, this growth of nursing home chains seemed to slow down as the 
proportion of chain owned facilities remained at around 50% (Grabowski et al., 2016). However, 
according to the data used in this study, the proportion of chain-related transactions remained at 
approximately 10% each year. More specifically, each year, about 3% of the total nursing homes 
in the United States would join a chain, with little fluctuation over the past two decades.  
Earlier studies exploring the determinants of chain acquisitions largely focused on the 
hospital industry. McCue and Furst (1986), Phillips (1999), and Menke (1997) all found that 
chains tended to acquire independent hospitals that were financially distressed. Sloan et al. 
(2003) concluded that a low profit margin was consistently an important antecedent of ownership 
conversions in the hospital industry. Since year 2000, researchers started to explore chain 
acquisitions in the nursing home industry. Banaszak-Holl et al. (2002) studied acquisitions of 
nursing homes from 1991 through 1997. They found that nursing homes with lower quality 
performance were more likely to be acquired. By examining nursing homes in the United States 
from 1993 to 2004, Grabowski and Stevenson (2008) found that for-profit nursing homes tended 
to acquire declining nursing homes while not-for-profit facilities were more likely to buy 
improving nursing homes. Bowblis (2011) found that nursing homes facing greater financial 
difficulty were more likely to experience for-profit/not-for-profit ownership conversion or 
closure during the period of 1998 through 2004. Using data from 1998 to 2010, Cadigan et al. 
(2015) suggested that private investment did not seem to affect nursing homes’ performance in 
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general. Similarly, Grabowski et al. (2016) found that low-quality nursing homes were more 
likely to be bought or sold by chains but noted that acquired facilities already had lower quality 
of care before the acquisitions. Outside of hospitals or nursing homes, a study focusing on the 
dialysis industry (Pozniak et al., 2010) found financial stress and better quality of care were 
predictors for chain acquisition of independent dialysis facilities. In addition to ownership 
changes, a few studies focused on nursing home closures. More competitive environment (Castle 
2005), lower quality and higher Medicaid occupancy rates (Castle et al. 2009), poor prior 
financial performance (Zinn et al. 2009) were associated with increased risk of nursing home 
closures. 
3.2 Conceptual framework 
Theoretically, chain acquisition of independent facilities could generate benefits for both 
acquiring chains and targeted facilities. From the targeted facilities’ perspective, acquisitions 
allow them to gain access to capital, centralized administrative and clinical support through the 
chain organization. Independent facilities may benefit from acquisitions through knowledge 
transfer, standardizing operational process, and effective management skills so quality of care 
may be improved. In addition, the joint production of facilities owned by the same chain could 
generate economies of scale that could reduce the purchase costs for equipment and supplies. 
From a chain’s perspective, the chain may seek to increase its market power by acquiring 
independent facilities (Wells and Banaszak-Holl, 2000; Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002). Increased 
market power leads to cheaper labor and supply expenses, and possibly higher private-pay 
prices. Acquiring more facilities could help a chain expand its reach to the markets served by the 
acquired facilities so it has a larger resident base. Hirth et al. (2017) indicated that nursing home 
chains may prefer to expand their presence across a larger geographic area without necessarily 
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increasing concentration in local markets. Similarly, Dafny et al. (2016) demonstrated that cross-
market hospital mergers may result in higher prices. In addition, a chain may be able to offer 
additional services by acquiring facilities specializing in different service lines. For example, if 
the acquired facilities have specialty care units that were rarely offered by the chain before, the 
acquisition would benefit the chain in terms of expanding its product line. In addition to facility-
level characteristics, previous research suggests that nursing home ownership change may be 
also driven by broader policy and market factors (Stevenson et al., 2006). 
Following Sloan et al. (2003), I start the conceptual model by analyzing targeted 
independent nursing homes and acquiring chains’ objectives when being involved in an 
ownership transaction. Consider an independent nursing home and a nursing home chain that is 
interested in acquiring. The current owner of the independent nursing home has an anticipated 
Net Present Value (NPV) until its final period, estimated at NPVa. The chain offers a purchasing 
price based on its own evaluation, estimated at NPVb. Then, the decision on a transaction 
depends upon the comparison between the independent nursing home owner’s value NPVa and 
the chain’s value of the home NPVb. If the independent home’s current owner values the home 
more than the chain does, such as 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑎 > 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑏, the nursing home is not sold. Otherwise, the 
independent nursing home will be acquired by the chain. 
If the potential buyer can leverage its management skills and operate more efficiently, it 
could achieve cost savings in the long run. After the transaction, the chain could standardize its 
administration process and help the acquired nursing home improve its access to capital. 
Therefore, it is possible for a nursing home chain to offer a higher purchase price with the 
objective of achieving cost savings and improving profit margins in the long run. Based on the 
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conceptual framework stated above, Sloan et al. (2003) predicted and empirically confirmed that 
hospitals with worse financial performance were more likely to experience ownership changes. 
Banaszak-Holl et al. (2002) argued that nursing home chains could have two acquisition 
strategies: “turn around” and “cream skimming”. The “turn around” strategy indicates that 
targeted facilities had poorer performance before acquisitions. Under this strategy, chains would 
hope to use their management skills to improve acquired facilities’ performance. In contrast, the 
“cream skimming” strategy suggests that chains would acquire high-performing targets. Under 
this scenario, chains would take advantage of the acquired facilities to enhance chains’ 
reputation, to expand their market share or to reduce competition. 
Empirical findings from most of the existing studies support the “turn around” strategy. 
Although evaluating the effects of chain acquisitions is beyond the scope of this study,  I 
hypothesize that independent nursing homes with worse financial performance are more likely to 
be acquired by corporate chains. In addition, the size of acquiring chains may matter. The 
determinants of acquisition decisions could differ between large and small chains. For example, 
larger acquiring chains may have better resources in terms of centralized administration process 
and access to capital. Prior studies found significant differences between chains with different 
sizes in both antecedents of acquisitions (Pozniak et al., 2010) and effects of acquisitions 
(Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002). Therefore, I expect that larger chains are likely to acquire 
independent nursing homes with even worse financial performance, compared to smaller chains 
do. 
Also note that, although this study focuses on facility-level financial characteristics that 
could affect chain acquisition decisions, macro-level policy and market factors such as state 
regulations and Medicaid payments, and other aspects such as facilities’ performance on the 
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report cards could play essential roles in chain acquisitions as well. Evaluating how these factors 
affect acquisitions is beyond the scope of this study.    
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Datasets 
In this study, I track the chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes from 2000 to 
2010. Financial measures and other covariates are lagged by one year to allow for possible 
contemporaneous effects on the probability of chain acquisitions. More specifically, the data 
comes from five sources: the Online Survey Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) system, the 
Medicare Cost Reports (MCRs) for nursing homes, LTC Focus, Area Health Resource File 
(AHRF), and National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). 
Nursing homes’ structural characteristics (e.g., chain affiliation), staffing measures, and 
quality information are extracted from the OSCAR. Collected and administered by Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), OSCAR2 is an online data system used by the federal 
government to determine if Medicare/Medicaid certified nursing homes are compliant with 
federal regulations. Every 9 to 15 months, on average 12 months, each federally certified nursing 
home receives an on-site inspection conducted by local state agencies. Nursing homes in the 
OSCAR represent about 96% of the total nursing homes in the United States. A typical OSCAR 
survey includes information such as facility structural characteristics, staffing information and 
detailed health inspection data. 
                                                 
 
2 Effective July 2012, the OSCAR system was replaced by the Certification and Survey Provider Enhanced 
Reporting (CASPER) system. In this study, I still use OSCAR as it was the name during the study period. 
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Medicare Cost Reports (MCRs) for skilled nursing facilities (CMS-2540-96 for fiscal years 
before 2010; CMS-2540-10 for fiscal years 2010) are used to extract financial information for 
nursing homes. Each year, every Medicare-certified nursing home is required to file its cost 
report in order to receive Medicare reimbursements. The report includes detailed financial 
information such as revenues and expenses at the facility level. Nursing homes with a reporting 
period of at least 360 days are included in the analysis. The financial measures are drawn from 
the Balance Sheet (Worksheet G) and Statement of Revenues and Expenses (Worksheet G3). In 
addition, I follow recent studies focusing on nursing homes’ financial performance and private 
prices (Bowblis, 2015; Huang and Hirth, 2016) and drop observations with missing or negative 
values in financial measures where values should be positive. To address the outliers, 
observations at the top and bottom 1% values based on operating profit margins are dropped. 
A selected set of county characteristics are extracted from LTC Focus and AHRF. 
Maintained at Brown University, LTC Focus is a website that provides a variety of aggregated 
data on state policies and county market forces related to nursing home care in the United State. 
AHRF is used to extract county-level unemployment rates and per capita income. NCSL is used 
to collect Certificate-of-Need (CON) laws in each state during the study period. 
Because each nursing home is assigned a federal provider identification number which is 
available in both datasets, I use this number and year information to link the facility 
characteristics from OSCAR and financial information from MCRs. Then, I use county and state 
identifiers to extract variables from LTC Focus, AHRF, and NCSL. Nursing homes located in 
Alaska, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and Hawaii are excluded because the OSCAR data is 
incomplete. In addition, government-owned facilities are dropped because they might have 
different organizational structures and objectives than private nursing homes. Furthermore, 
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hospital-based nursing homes are excluded because their financial information is embedded in 
the affiliated hospitals’ cost reports. Due to unmatched nursing homes between OSCAR and 
MCRs or observations with missing, negative or outlier values in financial measures, the final 
analytical sample includes 14,186 unique nursing homes with non-missing values in financial 
measures between 2000 and 2010. 
The nursing homes that are included in this study are facilities that were open either before 
or at the beginning of the study period. A very small number of nursing homes that closed during 
the study period are excluded. Because this study focuses on chain acquisitions of independent 
nursing homes, in the analytical sample, each nursing home started as independent. Then, the 
facility either remained independent throughout the study period or became chain-owned due to 
acquisitions. Therefore, nursing homes that were owned by chains before 2000 were excluded 
from the study sample.  
3.3.2 Measures 
 Chain acquisitions 
The main dependent variable is a binary chain acquisition indicator, with “1” indicating an 
independent nursing home was acquired by a chain and “0” indicating an independent nursing 
home remained independent in a calendar year. The chain affiliation information comes from 
two fields in the OSCAR: (1) if the facility has a multi-organizational affiliation and (2) name of 
the multi-institution. It is worth noting that the field of name of multi-institution is a text field. 
The raw information from this field is subject to reporting issues such as typos, abbreviations and 
other potential inconsistencies over the years. To improve the accuracy of the chain name 
variable, a recently published study (Grabowski et al., 2016) adopted an extensive line-by-line 
search approach to verify and correct the names of the affiliated chain for each nursing home 
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when necessary. In this study, I follow their approach to clean the chain variables and use the 
cleaned chain indicator and chain name information. 
 Chain size 
Another dependent variable of interests is the size of acquiring chains. To explore the 
possible heterogeneity in acquisitions by chain size, I create a chain category variable indicating 
the size of the acquiring chains. In the sample, a chain owns 9-10 nursing homes on average. 
Therefore, a large chain is defined as an organization that owns 11 or more nursing homes 
nationally; while a small chain owns 2 to 10 nursing homes nationally in a given year. This 
dependent variable is coded “2” for an acquisition by large chains, “1” for acquisition by small 
chains, and “0” for independent nursing homes remaining independent. 
 Financial performance 
In this study, I use three financial measures: operating profit margin, current ratio, and 
occupancy rate. Operating profit margin is defined as the ratio of operating profits to operating 
revenues. Operating revenues are defined as the total revenues related to direct patient care, 
excluding any contractual allowances and discounts or incomes from investment or donations. 
Operating expenses are costs related to direct patient care. Operating profits equal operating 
revenues less operating costs. Operating profit margin is an indicator of the overall profitability 
from operations of a nursing home. Previous studies focusing on financial performance of 
nursing homes consistently used this measure (Bowblis, 2011, 2015; Weech-Maldonado et al., 
2012; Pradhan et al.,2013; Cadigan et al., 2015). Current ratio is defined as short-term assets 
divided by short-term liabilities. It is an indicator of short-term liquidity for nursing homes. 
Lower liquidity poses a higher risk of bankruptcy as well as a higher cost of capital (Wedig et al., 
1988; Wedig et al., 1996; Sloan et al., 2003; Bowblis, 2011; Cadigan et al., 2015). In addition, 
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occupancy rate measures the operating efficiency of a nursing home, which is an important 
indicator for the financial health of a nursing home. In sum, low operating profit margins, low 
current ratios, or low occupancy rates indicate financial difficulty for a nursing home.  
 Covariates 
I include a group of facility-level control variables from OSCAR to account for other 
factors which could affect the probability of chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes. 
More specifically, I control for profit status, number of beds, payer mix, number of health 
deficiencies, acuity index, presence of specialty care unit, registered nurses (RN) hours per 
resident day, licensed practical nurses (LPN) hours per resident day, and certified nurse aids 
(CNA) hours per resident day. In addition, I include a measure of each nursing home’s age, 
defined as the number of years in operation, as an indicator for capital depreciation as well as 
survival prospect of the facility. 
To account for macro-level factors which might affect chain acquisitions at the county and 
state level, I use three state policy variables: CON laws, Medicaid reimbursement rates, and 
Medicaid case mix reimbursement policy. At the county level, I include several characteristics 
including number of home health agencies per one thousand elderly, number of nurses per one 
thousand elderly, Herfindahl Hirschman Index based on bed size, county unemployment rate, 
and per capita income.  
3.4 Empirical approach 
The dependent variable in this study is chain acquisition of independent nursing homes and 
the independent variables of interest are financial measures of independent nursing homes one 
year before acquisition. A standard logit model is used to predict the probability that an 
independent nursing home is acquired by a nursing home chain in a given year during the study 
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period. The unit of analysis is facility-year. Chain acquisitions are tracked from 2000 to 2010. 
There is a one-year lag between independent variables and the acquisition indicator variable (1 = 
acquisition; 0 = stay independent) to allow for the potential contemporaneous effects on 
acquisition decisions. During the study period, each nursing home started as an independent 
facility at the beginning. Then, a nursing home ended either (1) when it was acquired by a chain 
or (2) it stayed independent throughout the study period. Therefore, nursing homes entered the 
model up to 11 years. Standard errors are clustered at the facility level to control for the serial 
correlation between observations within a facility across years. Because of the way the data is set 
up, the estimation here is essentially a discrete-time hazard model (Allison, 1982; Jenkins, 1995).  
More specifically, the main outcome of interest is the probability of a nursing home 𝑖 is 
acquired by a chain at time 𝑡: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 | 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡, 𝒙𝑖𝑡−1)  (1) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the conditional probability that a nursing home 𝑖 is acquired by a chain at time 𝑡, 
given that the acquisition has not been occurred to the nursing home 𝑖 prior to time 𝑡. Then, the 
logit model can be expressed as below: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃𝑖𝑡
1−𝑃𝑖𝑡
) = 𝛼𝑡−1 + 𝜷
′𝒙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 (2) 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 are a set of time-varying facility-level predictors including the financial performance 
which could affect the probability of a chain’s acquisition of the targeted independent nursing 
home. 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 is the error term. In addition, I include a set of year dummies to control for year 
trends. I also account for the possible regional variation in chain acquisitions by including a set 
of regional dummies. The interpretation of the coefficients 𝜷′ is the change in log odds of an 
independent nursing home being acquired by a chain associated with one unit change in the 
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predictor of interest, holding other covariates constant. To ease the interpretation, the results are 
presented in terms of the marginal effects (Norton and Dowd, 2018). 
To test the heterogeneity in acquisitions by size of acquiring chains, a multinomial probit 
model is employed. The dependent variable in this model is a categorical variable that takes on 
the following values: 0 = remaining independent; 1 = acquired by a small chain; 2 = acquired by 
a large chain. The multinomial probit model is appropriate for this study because it relaxes the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption by using a multinomial logit model 
(McFadden, 1973). For example, in this study, the IIA assumption would be that the existence of 
acquisition by large chains has no impact on the ratio of choice between an independent nursing 
home remaining independent and an independent nursing home to be acquired by a small chain. 
However, the error terms between acquisitions by large chains and acquisitions by small chains 
are likely to be correlated, which would violate the IIA assumption. Instead, the multinomial 
probit model is more flexible, allowing the error terms to be correlated3. Similar to the logit 
model, I control for year trends and region variations in this multinomial logit model. Given the 
way the data is set up, this multinomial logit model is equivalent to the competing risk model in 
the discrete-time hazard model. 
3.5 Results 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the changes in proportion of chain-owned nursing homes in the 
sample from years 2000 to 2010. During the study period, the percent of chain-owned nursing 
homes decreased steadily from about 59% in 2000 to 54% in 2010. This trend is in contrast with 
                                                 
 
3 Another option is to use a nested logit model. However, this study lacks of choice-level variables (e.g., 
variables specific to each type of chain acquisitions) which is required for appropriately estimating a nested logit 
model. 
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the rapid growth of chains in the nursing home industry during the 1990s (Banaszak-Holl et al., 
2002) but is consistent with the findings from more recent studies (Grabowski et al., 2016; Hirth 
et al., 2017). Note that the study sample excludes hospital-based or government-owned nursing 
homes, which account for about 13% of the total nursing home-year observations. Therefore, to 
some extent, the sample over-represents the chain-owned facilities. The reported proportion of 
chain-owned nursing homes in this study is slightly higher than what was reported in recent 
studies (e.g., Grabowski et al., 2016) using all types of nursing homes. 
Although the overall proportion of the chain-owned nursing homes remained relatively 
stable during the study period, especially after early 2000s, it does not necessarily indicate that 
chain-related transactions are few. Instead, a substantial amount of chain acquisitions and 
divestitures occurred during the period. More specifically, there are 14,186 unique nursing 
homes with non-missing financial information in the sample. Among these homes, 4440 facilities 
(31.3%) were always independent, 5460 facilities (38.5%) were always owned by chains, 4000 
facilities (28.2%) had experienced at least one of the chain-related transactions, while 286 
facilities (2%) were closed during the study period. 
Table 3.1 presents the number of different types of chain related events including (1) 
acquisitions of independent nursing homes, (2) acquisitions of chain-owned nursing homes, (3) 
divestitures of chain-owned nursing homes, (4) nursing homes remaining unchanged in 
ownership, and (5) new nursing homes from 2000 to 2010. The percent of chain acquisitions of 
independent nursing homes among all nursing homes each year ranged from 2.6% to 3.5% 
throughout the study period, with an annual average at about 3%. Similarly, the average rates of 
divestiture of chain-owned nursing homes were also about 3%. On average, acquisitions of 
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chain-owned nursing homes accounted for about 4% of nursing homes each year. In addition, 
about 0.3% of the nursing homes entered the market each year. 
Unlike the hospital industry, for-profit is the predominant organizational form in the 
nursing home industry. During the period between 2000 and 2010, a majority of the nursing 
homes were for-profit entities, accounting for more than 76% of the total nursing homes. Among 
all chain-owned nursing homes, about 83% of them were for-profit facilities. 
During the study period, the number of nursing home chains gradually decreased from 815 
in 2000 to 739 in 2010. Numbers of nursing homes owned by a chain varied from 2 to 541. An 
average nursing home chain owned about ten facilities. Using the categorization based on the 
number of nursing homes owned by each chain, 82.4% of the chains were small (2-10 facilities), 
while about 17.6% of the chains were large (11 or more facilities). This distribution remained 
relatively stable across years. A majority of the nursing home chains operated locally. From 2000 
to 2010, about 90.4% of the nursing home chains operated in three or fewer states, while 
approximate 69% of the chains operated in just one state. Only slightly more than 2% of the 
chains operated in more than ten states. 
Table 3.2 presents the overall trend of financial measures of all nursing homes in the 
sample from 2000 to 2010. The average operating margins for nursing homes were low, at about 
0.01 across years. From 2000 to 2003, the average operating profit margins were close to zero or 
even negative in a few years. Since 2004, nursing homes started to improve their operating 
margins, ranging from 0.013 in 2004 to 0.026 in 2010. Following a similar pattern to the 
operating margins, current ratios, which measure the ratios of current assets to current liabilities, 
decreased slightly from 2.42 in 2000 to 2.2 in 2003. Then, the average current ratios gradually 
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increased back to 2.43 in year 2010, with little fluctuation. Average occupancy rates 
monotonically decreased from 86.1% in 1998 to 83.4% in 2010. 
In addition to presenting the overall trend of financial measures for all nursing homes, I 
also compare financial performance between independent and chain-owned nursing homes, 
shown in the first two columns of Table 3.3. More specifically, compared to their independent 
counterparts, chain-owned nursing homes had significantly higher operating margins and current 
ratios but lower occupancy rates. In the last two columns of Table 3.3, when further separating 
chains based on their sizes, large chains had the highest operating margins and current ratios, 
compared to small chain-owned or independent nursing homes. On the other hand, occupancy 
rates of independent nursing homes were the highest among these three types of nursing homes, 
while nursing homes owned by large chains had the lowest occupancy rates.    
Next, I turn to the focus of this study – chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes. 
Table 3.4 presents the baseline comparison of nursing homes that were (1) in the treatment 
group: starting as independent but ending as being acquired by chains, and (2) in the control 
group: remaining independent throughout the study period. In this analysis, I also exclude 286 
nursing homes that closed at some point during the study period. In general, compared to 
independent nursing homes that remained independent during the study period, independent 
nursing homes that were acquired during the study period had worse financial measures at the 
baseline. Both types of nursing homes had negative profit margins at the baseline, reflecting the 
financial challenges faced by the industry after the implementation of Medicare PPS in 1998. 
More specifically, independent nursing homes that were later involved in chain acquisitions had 
an average of -0.02 in profit margins, while independent nursing homes remaining independent 
throughout the study period had profit margins at around -0.01. Similarly, later acquired nursing 
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homes had lower current ratios at the baseline than their independent counterparts did, reflecting 
poorer short-term liquidity and therefore higher bankruptcy risks. In addition, independent 
nursing homes that were later acquired by chains had lower occupancy rates by about three 
percentage points, which indicates lower operating efficiency levels. 
This clear pattern between independent nursing homes that were acquired and those 
remaining independent at the baseline year is consistent across nursing homes’ structural 
characteristics, staffing, and quality of care. More specifically, at the baseline, acquired nursing 
homes were more likely to be for-profit facilities, had higher proportion of Medicaid census, 
were slightly younger, had fewer CNA hours per resident day, and were more likely to have 
lower quality of care (e.g., higher number of health deficiencies, higher proportion of residents 
with catheter, bedsores, or physical restraint). 
In short, most of these comparisons suggest that independent nursing homes that were 
acquired later were lower-performing facilities at the baseline. In terms of macro-level factors, 
later acquired independent nursing homes were located in states that had lower Medicaid rates 
and were less likely to have Medicaid casemix policy or CON laws in place.  
Results from the discrete-time logit model are shown in Table 3.5 using different model 
specifications. Column (1) reports results from the model that uses financial measures as well as 
all other facility-level characteristics as the predictors; column (2) reports results from the model 
that adds county characteristics; column (3) reports results from the model that incorporates three 
state policy variables; column (4) reports results from the model that adds both county and state 
level variables. To ease the interpretation of the regression coefficients, Table 3.5 reports the 
marginal effects of these factors on the probability that an independent nursing home was 
acquired by a chain from 2000 to 2010. 
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Overall, marginal effects of the financial measures are fairly consistent across different 
model specifications. Operating profit margins, current ratios, and occupancy rates all show 
negative and statistically significant associations with the probability that an independent nursing 
home was acquired by a chain. Given the consistency of the coefficients of financial measures 
across different models, I focus on the discussion using the results from the full model presented 
in column (4). Independent nursing homes that had worse financial measures were more likely to 
be acquired by chains one year later. For example, a decrease of 0.01 in the operating profit 
margin is associated with 0.0003 (p < 0.01) increase in the probability that an independent 
nursing home was acquired by chains, holding other factors constant. To put the interpretation 
into more specific context, using the relative term, a decrease of 10% in the operating profit 
margin is associated with 0.3% increase in the probability. Similarly, a decrease in current ratio 
is marginally (p < 0.10) associated with an increase in the probability of chain acquisition. One 
percentage point decrease in the occupancy rate of an independent nursing home is associated 
with 0.0006 (p < 0.01) increase in the probability of chain acquisition. Using the relative term, a 
10% decrease in the occupancy rate is associated with 17.7% increase in the probability of an 
independent nursing home is acquired by a chain. To sum up, although the magnitudes are 
relatively small, worse financial performance of an independent nursing home is consistently 
associated with an increase in the probability of that facility is being acquired by a chain. 
For other facility-level controls, most of the nursing home structural characteristics have 
significant associations with the probability of acquisition. More specifically, for-profit status, 
proportion of residents relying on public payers such as Medicare and Medicaid, and presence of 
a specialty care unit all have positive and statistically significant associations with the probability 
that an independent nursing home was acquired by a chain, holding other factors constant. In 
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contrast, independent nursing homes that had more beds or had been in business longer were less 
likely to be acquired by chains, all else equal. More LPN hours per resident day and fewer RN or 
CNA hours per patient day are associated with an increase in the likelihood of chain acquisitions 
of independent nursing homes. Among all four quality indicators, only the number of health 
deficiencies has a positive and significant association with an independent nursing home was 
acquired by a chain, holding other factors constant. At the macro level, chain acquisitions of 
independent nursing homes were likely to occur in states with lower Medicaid reimbursement 
rates or states that did not have CON laws in place. 
Table 3.6 presents the results of financial predictors of chain acquisitions by chain size. In 
this multinomial probit model, the dependent variable has three categories: independent nursing 
homes that were not acquired (coded as 0, the reference category), independent nursing homes 
that were acquired by small chains (coded as 1), and independent nursing homes that were 
acquired by large chains (coded as 2). Overall, different types of acquiring chains in terms of 
their size show some heterogeneity across measures. As hypothesized, independent nursing 
homes with worse profit margins are more likely to be acquired by large chains (p < 0.05), but 
not by small chains (p > 0.10). Lower occupancy rates are significantly associated with an 
increase in the probability of chain acquisitions by both small chains and large chains.  
3.6 Discussion 
Chain-owned nursing homes constantly account for more than half of the total nursing 
homes in the United States. During the past two decades, although the overall proportion of 
chain-owned nursing homes remained relatively steady, the nursing home industry experienced a 
significant amount of chain-related transactions (Grabowski et al., 2016). Mainly concerned by 
implications of nursing home chains on quality of care, both the U.S. government (GAO 2010, 
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2011) and health policy researchers (Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002; Stevenson and Grabowski, 
2008; Cadigan et al., 2015; Grabowski et al., 2016; Hirth et al., 2017) raised the necessity of 
closely monitoring these chain transactions. Building on existing research that focused on factors 
associated with nursing home chains (Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002, Cadigan et al., 2015; 
Grabowski et al., 2016), this study evaluates the relationship between financial performance of 
targeted independent nursing homes and chain acquisitions. More specifically, this study 
contributes to existing research on nursing home chains by (1) focusing on chain acquisitions of 
independent nursing homes, (2) incorporating financial measures into modeling acquisition 
decisions, (3) exploring heterogeneities between small and large chain acquisitions, and (4) using 
a unique dataset that contains more accurate chain ownership information. 
Overall, I find that chains are more likely to acquire independent nursing homes with 
worse financial performance. For example, lower profit margins, lower current ratios, and lower 
occupancy rates are all significantly associated with higher probabilities of independent nursing 
homes were acquired by chains, holding other factors constant. The association between these 
financial indicators of independent nursing homes and the decisions on chain acquisitions is 
consistent across different model specifications by adding macro-level factors such as county 
characteristics and state policy variables. In addition, when exploring the heterogeneity by chain 
size, I find that lower profit margins are significantly associated with large chain acquisitions but 
not small chain acquisitions. Lower occupancy rates are associated with both small and large 
chain acquisitions. 
In general, the main findings from this study are consistent with previous literatures on 
predictors for ownership changes (Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002; Sloan et al., 2003; Bowblis, 2011). 
Lower profitability (profit margins), lower short-term liquidity (current ratios) and lower 
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operating efficiency (occupancy rates) are all important predictors for chain acquisitions of 
independent nursing homes. The nursing home industry has had thin profit margins since the 
Medicare PPS. This study shows that financially lower performing nursing homes are likely to 
be the targets for chain acquisitions. The constant organizational changes have implications on 
operational stabilities, service provision, staffing, and quality of care (Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002; 
Stevenson and Grabowski, 2008; Harrington et al., 2012; Grabowski et al., 2016). Therefore, the 
findings from this study raise the importance of government oversight and regulations (GAO, 
2010; GAO, 2011).  
In addition, both small and large acquiring chains target independent nursing homes with 
worse financial performance. However, compared to small nursing home chains, large chains are 
more likely to target independent nursing homes that have lower profit margins. Typically, larger 
chains have better resources in terms of centralized administration process and access to capital. 
Therefore, when considering acquiring independent financially lower performing nursing homes, 
larger chains may have more room to reduce costs after acquisitions so they can afford to take 
these homes with worse financial performance. 
It is also worth noting that this study focuses on the antecedents of chain acquisitions of 
independent nursing homes. Previous literature on nursing homes (Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002) 
and dialysis facilities (Pozniak et al., 2010) observed both “turn around” and “cream skimming”. 
Whether or not (and to which direction) chains can affect acquired nursing homes’ performance 
is beyond the scope of this study. However, future studies should focus on this aspect, especially 
given that a majority of the current studies focusing on nursing homes are cross-sectional studies 
which lack the abilities of drawing causal inference. Furthermore, the risk and benefit of chain 
 161 
acquisitions should continue to be evaluated because chains play an important role in the nursing 
home industry.  
This study has several limitations. First, although the accuracy of the chain variables (chain 
affiliation and chain names) is improved by the careful re-coding process, reporting errors are 
not likely to be eliminated completely due to the subjective nature of the text field in the 
OSCAR. In addition, ownership structure of nursing homes has become increasingly complex in 
the past two decades (Stevenson et al., 2006; Stevenson and Grabowski, 2008; GAO, 2010). It is 
not uncommon for a nursing home to have multiple owners to separate property management 
from their standard daily operations. In this study, the chain ownership mainly reflects the care 
management aspects of nursing homes. This limitation is due to the fact that most nursing homes 
only report the one name for the multi-facility organization in the OSCAR. Second, the overall 
negative association between financial measures and the probability that chain acquisitions of 
independent nursing homes does not necessarily reflect a causal relationship. Although the main 
findings hold across different model specifications including adding a set of county 
characteristics and state policy variables, other unobserved factors may still mediate the 
relationship between financial performance and acquisition decisions. For example, the 
emergence of local competition from assisted living facilities or home health agencies 
((Grabowski et al., 2012; Bowblis, 2014) could affect the financial performance of nursing 
homes and chains acquisition decisions at the same time, which could complicate the observed 
relationship between them. Unfortunately, this study does not have more detailed information on 
these alternative long-term care models. Third, this study focuses on facility-level financial 
performance associated with acquisition decisions. In the future, if data allows, incorporating 
chain-level characteristics could be more informative to reflect a more balanced perspective from 
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both targets and buyers in acquisition decisions. Fourth, due to the data limitation, I examine the 
chain acquisitions of independent nursing homes from 2000 to 2010 in this study. It does not 
necessarily reflect the most recent trend in the past decade. The traditional nursing home industry 
has been declining during the past few decades. In recent years, in the long-term care industry, 
more and more chain organizations own two or more product lines such as nursing homes, 
assisted living facilities, home health agencies, and adult day-care centers. The revenue share 
from traditional nursing homes operation has declined over time. Therefore, using a more recent 
data to examine the issue could better reflect this changing landscape. 
In recent decades, states’ fiscal constraints create additional challenges for nursing homes. 
Financial health of nursing homes has important implications on access to care, service 
provisions, and quality of care. Nursing homes with worse financial performance are likely to 
face limitations in improving quality of care and therefore creating risks for vulnerable elderly 
residents. In this study, I find that this type of nursing home is more likely to be acquired by 
chains. In general, policy makers and researchers have linked chain affiliation with poor quality 
of care and low staffing levels among nursing homes (Stevenson and Grabowski, 2008; GAO, 
2011; Harrington et al., 2012; Grabowski et al., 2016). Since a majority of nursing homes’ 
revenues come from federal programs such as Medicaid and Medicare, it is important for policy 
makers to monitor these chain acquisitions and to use predictors suggested by the existing 
literature to anticipate these chain related events. Public reporting has become an important 
policy tool in the nursing home industry to help consumers make more informed choices and to 
encourage providers to improve quality of care. Given the technical difficulty in accessing 
information such as financial data by general consumers, policy makers should consider 
incorporating these important financial measures into the Nursing Home Compare – the current 
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public reporting website for nursing homes in the United States. Such actions could be employed 
to better predict the probability that an independent nursing home is acquired by chains. In 
addition, suggested by Grabowski et al. (2016), lower quality nursing homes are more likely to 
be bought or sold by nursing home chains. Regulators could establish an early warning system 
that includes these financial measures as well as other important factors to identify lower-
performing nursing homes in advance and to conduct necessary interventions to prevent these 
facilities from being the “hot potatoes” that are constantly involved in chain related transactions, 
which eventually could jeopardize the quality of care for frail elderly living in those facilities. 
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3.8 Figures  
Figure 3. 1 Trend of proportion of chain-owned nursing homes from 2000 to 2010 
 
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs, LTC Focus, AHRF, and 
NCSL from 2000 to 2010. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or 
government owned facilities; (3) facilities with missing, negative or outlier values in financial measures. 
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3.9 Tables  
Table 3. 1 Number of chain related events among nursing homes by year 
Year Acquisition of 
independent 
NHs 
Acquisition 
of chain-
owned NHs 
Divestiture 
of chain-
owned NHs 
NHs without 
ownership 
change 
New NHs Total 
NHs 
in the 
sample 
2000 238 2.4% 338 3.4% 214 2.2% 9097 91.6% 49 0.5% 9,936 
2001 287 2.9% 517 5.2% 281 2.8% 8902 88.8% 38 0.4% 10,025 
2002 329 3.2% 682 6.7% 462 4.5% 8661 85.1% 39 0.4% 10,173 
2003 274 2.6% 440 4.2% 360 3.5% 9299 89.4% 32 0.3% 10,405 
2004 291 2.8% 454 4.3% 357 3.4% 9392 89.2% 41 0.4% 10,535 
2005 334 3.2% 361 3.5% 315 3.0% 9407 90.0% 41 0.4% 10,458 
2006 338 3.2% 460 4.4% 333 3.2% 9398 88.9% 37 0.4% 10,566 
2007 337 3.2% 526 4.9% 321 3.0% 9400 88.4% 44 0.4% 10,628 
2008 397 3.5% 530 4.7% 341 3.0% 10083 88.6% 30 0.3% 11,381 
2009 320 2.8% 371 3.2% 314 2.7% 10534 91.1% 23 0.2% 11,562 
2010 322 2.8% 290 2.6% 299 2.6% 10357 91.5% 46 0.4% 11,314 
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs, LTC Focus, AHRF, and 
NCSL from 2000 to 2010. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or 
government owned facilities; (3) facilities with missing, negative or outlier values in financial measures. 
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Table 3. 2 Trend of financial measures for all nursing homes by year 
 Operating profit margin Current ratio Occupancy rate 
2000 -0.003 2.412 86.14 
2001 0.000 2.368 85.91 
2002 0.002 2.217 85.85 
2003 -0.002 2.197 85.87 
2004 0.013 2.349 85.57 
2005 0.011 2.151 85.43 
2006 0.012 2.357 85.35 
2007 0.013 2.451 84.78 
2008 0.018 2.352 84.50 
2009 0.025 2.409 83.78 
2010 0.026 2.432 83.41 
N 116983   
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs, LTC Focus, AHRF, and 
NCSL from 2000 to 2010. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or 
government owned facilities; (3) facilities with missing, negative or outlier values in financial measures. 
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Table 3. 3 Comparison of financial measures for nursing homes by chain affiliation and 
chain size 
 Independent Chain-owned 
 All chain-owned Small chains  Large chains  
Profit margins 0.00456 0.0161*** 0.00534 0.0215*** 
 (0.116) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
     
Current ratios 2.297 2.370*** 2.227** 2.443*** 
 (3.650) (4.505) (4.417) (4.547) 
     
Occupancy rates 85.85 84.51*** 84.94*** 84.29*** 
 (13.75) (13.75) (13.67) (13.78) 
Observations 51,748 65,235 21,897 43,338 
The sample includes all nursing homes in the OSCAR with matching records in the MCRs from 2000 to 2010. Excluded 
nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; (3) facilities 
with missing values in financial measures. Small chains own two to ten nursing homes. Large chains own 11 or more 
nursing homes. Stars indicate the statistical significance based on the t-tests between each of the categories. The 
reference group is independent nursing homes. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3. 4 Summary statistics at the baseline year by acquisition 
 Independent NHs that 
were acquired by chains 
(treatment group) 
Independent NHs 
remaining independent 
(control group) 
Financial performance   
   
Profit margin -0.020** -0.011 
 (0.148) (0.140) 
Current ratio 2.036*** 2.474 
 (4.042) (4.165) 
Occupancy rate 83.092*** 86.066 
 (15.706) (15.089) 
Structural characteristics   
   
For profit 0.789*** 0.608 
 (0.408) (0.488) 
% Residents on Medicare 9.591 9.880 
 (11.195) (13.996) 
% Residents on Medicaid 64.379*** 60.850 
 (23.090) (25.528) 
Number of beds 113.927 112.287 
 (54.949) (73.239) 
Presence of any specialty care unit 0.242 0.225 
 (0.428) (0.418) 
Acuity Index 11.658 11.612 
 (1.322) (1.483) 
Number of years in operation 11.966*** 12.354 
 (9.916) (10.672) 
Staffing measures   
   
RN hour per resident day 0.357 0.419 
 (0.501) (0.665) 
LPN hour per resident day 0.750 0.761 
 (0.717) (0.888) 
CNA hour per resident day 2.169*** 2.387 
 (1.377) (1.888) 
Quality of care   
   
Number of health deficiencies 6.931*** 5.793 
 (6.250) (5.653) 
% Residents with catheter 6.180*** 5.652 
 (4.817) (5.106) 
% Residents with bedsores 7.399*** 6.756 
 (5.346) (5.189) 
% Residents with physical restraint 11.259*** 9.636 
 (12.222) (11.369) 
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County characteristics   
   
Number of home health agencies 
per 1000 elderly within a county 
0.236 0.232 
 (0.224) (0.226) 
Number of nurses per 1000 elderly 
within a county 
41.615 40.935 
 (31.726) (29.259) 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 0.181** 0.167 
 (0.220) (0.208) 
County unemployment rate 4.503* 4.626 
 (1.993) (2.103) 
County per capita income ($) 28561.636 30058.325 
 (8067.601) (9244.876) 
State policies   
   
State Medicaid rate ($) 132.155*** 141.370 
 (25.868) (30.202) 
State Medicaid casemix policy 0.598*** 0.676 
 (0.490) (0.468) 
State CON laws 0.688*** 0.724 
 (0.463) (0.447) 
Observations 1,457 4,268 
The sample includes independent nursing homes at their respective baseline years. Column (1) contains independent 
nursing homes that were acquired later during the study period (treatment group). Column (2) contains independent nursing 
homes that remained independent throughout the study period (control group). Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located 
in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; (3) facilities with missing values in financial measures 
or independent variables; (4) facilities that started as chain-owned at the beginning of the study period. Stars indicate the 
statistical significance based on the t-tests between treatment and control. The reference group is the control group that includes 
independent nursing homes remaining independent throughout the study period.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3. 5 Marginal effects of logit results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Financial 
performance 
    
     
Operating profit 
margin 
-0.0284*** -0.0285*** -0.0281*** -0.0278*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) 
Current ratio -0.0008* -0.0008* -0.0008* -0.0008* 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Occupancy rate -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Structural 
characteristics 
    
     
For profit 0.0203*** 0.0203*** 0.0210*** 0.0209*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
% Residents on 
Medicare 
0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
% Residents on 
Medicaid 
0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Number of beds (in 
10 beds) 
-0.0005** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0004** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Presence of any 
specialty care unit 
0.0072*** 0.0069*** 0.0073*** 0.0070*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Acuity Index 0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0015* 0.0016* 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Number of years in 
operation 
-0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Staffing measures     
     
RN hour per resident 
day 
-0.0130*** -0.0129*** -0.0135*** -0.0134*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
LPN hour per 
resident day 
0.0046** 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0041* 
 (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
CNA hour per 
resident day 
-0.0056*** -0.0054*** -0.0049*** -0.0047*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Quality of care     
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Number of health 
deficiencies 
0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
% Residents with 
catheter 
0.0003* 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
% Residents with 
bedsores 
0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
% Residents with 
physical restraint 
-0.00002 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
 
    
County 
characteristics 
    
     
Number of home 
health agencies per 
1000 elderly 
 0.0021  0.0007 
  (0.0049)  (0.0049) 
Number of nurses 
per 1000 elderly 
 0.0001**  0.0001* 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index 
 0.0019  0.0004 
  (0.0057)  (0.0057) 
County 
unemployment rate 
 -0.0015**  -0.0013** 
  (0.0007)  (0.0007) 
County per capita 
income ($1000) 
 -0.0001  -0.0001 
  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
State policies     
     
State Medicaid rate   -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
   (0.0001) (0.0001) 
State Medicaid 
casemix policy 
  0.0027 0.0023 
   (0.0027) (0.0028) 
State CON laws   -0.0114*** -0.0111*** 
   (0.0031) (0.0032) 
Observations 36866    
Standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes nursing homes that either stared as independent and remained 
independent throughout the study period (control group) or facilities that started as independent but were acquired by chains at 
some point during the study period (treatment group). Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities located in AK, HI, DC or PR; 
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(2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; (3) facilities with missing values in financial measures or independent 
variables; (4) facilities that started as chain-owned at the beginning of the study period. Year dummies and region dummies are 
estimated but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the facility level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3. 6 Marginal effects of multinomial probit results 
 Small chain 
acquisitions 
Large chain 
acquisitions 
Financial performance   
   
Operating profit margin  -0.0119 -0.0122** 
 (0.0087) (0.0057) 
Current ratio -0.0003 -0.0004 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Occupancy rate -0.0004*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Structural characteristics   
   
For profit 0.0104*** 0.0095*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0017) 
% Residents on Medicare 0.0001* 0.0002*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
% Residents on Medicaid 0.0001 0.0001** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Number of beds (in 10 beds) -0.0002* -0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Presence of any specialty care unit 0.0040* 0.0029** 
 (0.0022) (0.0014) 
Acuity Index 0.0007 0.0009* 
 (0.0007) (0.0005) 
Number of years in operation -0.0002* -0.0002** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Staffing measures   
   
RN hour per resident day -0.0072** -0.0052** 
 (0.0036) (0.0024) 
LPN hour per resident day 0.0020 0.0026** 
 (0.0021) (0.0012) 
CNA hour per resident day -0.0021* -0.0029*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) 
Quality of care   
   
Number of health deficiencies 0.0006*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) 
% Residents with catheter 0.0001 0.0002** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) 
% Residents with bedsores 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) 
% Residents with physical restraint 0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
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County characteristics   
   
Number of home health agencies per 1000 elderly 0.0009 0.0001 
 (0.0042) (0.0026) 
Number of nurses per 1000 elderly 0.0001** 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 0.0013 -0.0005 
 (0.0049) (0.0031) 
County unemployment rate -0.0010* -0.0003 
 (0.0006) (0.0003) 
County per capita income (in $1000) -0.00004 -0.00003 
 (0.0001) (0.00009) 
State policies   
   
State Medicaid rate -0.0001*** -0.00004 
 (0.0000) (0.00003) 
State Medicaid casemix policy 0.0012 0.0009 
 (0.0023) (0.0015) 
State CON laws -0.0070*** -0.0048*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0018) 
Observations 36866 36866 
Standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes nursing homes that either stared as independent and remained 
independent throughout the study period or facilities that started as independent but were acquired by chains at some point during 
the study period. Small chains own 2 to 9 nursing homes. Large chains own 10 or more nursing homes. Reference category is 
independent nursing homes remaining independent throughout the study period. Excluded nursing homes are: (1) facilities 
located in AK, HI, DC or PR; (2) hospital-based or government owned facilities; (3) facilities with missing values in financial 
measures or independent variables; (4) facilities that started as chain-owned at the beginning of the study period. Year dummies 
and region dummies are estimated but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the facility level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 
< 0.01 
